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ABSTRACT  
 
Growing environmental turbulence and increasingly complex supply chain 
networks have resulted in greater supply chain disruptions. Firm supply chain risk 
management performance varies due to differences in recognition of the need for and 
ability to cultivate supply chain risk management capabilities. This study helps to identify 
which capabilities have the greatest effect in supply chain risk management and firm 
performance as well as describes how to achieve them. A meta-analysis of empirical supply 
chain risk management studies reveals the confounding state of the field and points toward 
future work which can provide consensus and progress. A multiple case study describes 
organizational learning from supply chain disruption and identifies a new construct of 
bracketing necessary to deviate from firm risk dominant logic and respond to changes in 
the environment.  
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CHAPTER 1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
A core tenet of supply chain management is maintaining a constant supply of goods 
and services through their networks. Despite their best efforts, however, supply risk and 
disruptions are inevitable. A supply chain disruption is an event which interrupts this flow. 
Managing this supply chain risk of disruption is increasingly challenging and of growing 
interest to researchers and practitioners.  
Supply chain risk management has become increasingly challenging due to two 
factors. First, the environments in which supply chains operate has become increasingly 
dynamic and prone to disasters. One study reports that the top three disruptions are IT 
outages, natural disasters and supplier service issues (Glendon & Bird, 2013). At the same 
time, organizations are experiencing increasing competitive pressure, and engaging in 
more outsourcing and offshoring. This makes engaging and monitoring suppliers more 
difficult. This combination of factors make supply chain networks more vulnerable to 
disruptions (Blackhurst, Dunn, & Craighead, 2011; Bode, Wagner, Petersen, & Ellram, 2011; 
Christopher & Holweg, 2011; Craighead, Blackhurst, Rungtusanatham, & Handfield, 2007; 
Kim, Chen, & Linderman, 2015). This not only increases exposure to risk but propagation 
once a disruption occurs (Blackhurst, Craighead, Elkins, & Handfield, 2005; Craighead et al., 
2007; Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009). Propagation refers to the spread of a disruption, 
impacting dependent parties connected through supply chain networks.  
Firms vary in their approach to managing their supply chain risks and experience 
variation in outcomes as well. They vary in their beliefs about the importance of supply 
chain risk management. Even firms who are seeking to manage their supply chain risk do 
not always find they are able. It is difficult to know which capabilities to develop and how 
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to cultivate them. To make matters worse, due to environmental dynamism, the strategies 
and capabilities which maintain supply today may not be adequate tomorrow. Firms must 
remain vigilant and constantly adapt to their changing environment. Contingencies such as 
these impact the effectiveness of various capabilities. 
This study attempts to contribute to the understanding of what capabilities are most 
important in managing supply chain risk and how to develop them. Chapter 2 is a meta-
analytic study of the existing empirical supply chain risk management research. This is a 
quantitative literature review showing which capabilities are the most effective for supply 
chain risk management, and which combinations are complementary or tradeoffs. It also 
identifies which constructs would be fruitful avenues for future research. Chapter 3 is a 
qualitative study describing how firms can improve their resilience to a disruption through 
organizational learning. Specifically, we address the questions of how organizations 
respond to disruptions by learning greater resilience and why some learn more effectively 
than others. 
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CHAPTER 2 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT AND 
PERFORMANCE: A META ANALYTIC INVESTIGATION 
 
Pam Manhart, Dr. James Summers, Dr. Jennifer Blackhurst 
2.1 Introduction 
Supply chain risk is the susceptibility to a supply chain disruption which is  an 
interruption in the flow of materials (Craighead et al., 2007). The supply chain risk 
management process has been described with varying numbers of steps but they all have 
three basic phases in common: 1) prevention and preparation, 2) the disruption 
occurrence, and 3) response and recovery. Several mitigation capabilities have been 
identified to prepare for and prevent supply chain disruptions: contingency planning 
(Christopher & Lee, 2004), information sharing (Brandon‐Jones, Squire, Autry, & Petersen, 
2014), postponement (Boone, Craighead, & Hanna, 2007), supplier monitoring (Blackhurst 
et al., 2011), trust (Bode et al., 2011) and redundancies such as dual sourcing (Chopra & 
Sodhi, 2004), safety stocks (Manuj & Mentzer, 2008a) and excess capacity (Peck, 2005). 
Proactive supply chain risk management capabilities are important because of the 
significant losses incurred. Backorders and lost sales have negative impacts to customer 
service and market share (Hendricks & Singhal, 2005). Operational losses are due to a mix 
of idle resources and expedite costs (Hohenstein, Feisel, Hartmann, Giunipero, & Saenz, 
2015; Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009; Sodhi, Son, & Tang, 2012; Wagner & Bode, 2008). This 
combination of factors quickly deteriorates financial performance due to simultaneously 
reduced revenues and increased expenses. Negative relational outcomes also occur due to 
supply chain disruptions (Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009; Sodhi et al., 2012). Brand damage 
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occurs in the marketplace and reputations are damaged with suppliers. Internally, 
employees can lose faith in their supply chain. 
Mitigation capabilities have also been identified to respond and recover from a 
disruption: agility (Christopher & Towill, 2001), bridging linkages (Bode et al., 2011), 
communication (Manuj & Mentzer, 2008b), coordination (Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005), early 
detection (Craighead et al., 2007), flexibility (Skipper & Hanna, 2009), and root cause 
analysis (Elkins, Handfield, Blackhurst, & Craighead, 2005) to name a few.  
Reactive supply chain risk management capabilities are important because firm 
losses have greater impact as disruptions propagate through the network over time. Firms 
with superior supply chain risk management can experience shorter recoveries with 
reduced losses. Likewise, when a disruption impacts an industry, it can be a source of 
competitive advantage for the firm recovering first (Craighead et al., 2007; Fiksel, Polyviou, 
Croxton, & Pettit, 2015; Greening & Rutherford, 2011; Skipper & Hanna, 2009). Similarly, 
marketing research has found that some firms can gain stronger relationships by 
responding well to a breach of trust as opposed to no event occurring (Aaker, Fournier, & 
Brasel, 2004). 
The literature in supply chain risk management reveals a lack of consensus. One 
sign of lack of consensus is the inconsistent use of definitions. For example, Hohenstein et 
al. (2015) discovered 46 unique definitions of supply chain resilience. What resilience 
definitions have in common is the capability to manage flow, either preventing or quickly 
recovering from a supply chain disruption. Similarly, supply chain resilience has been 
Brandon‐Jones et al. (2014) describe resilience and robustness as a continuum from 
flexibility to stability while Durach, Wieland, and Machuca (2015) describe resiliency as an 
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overall supply chain risk management capability balancing proactive and reactive 
capabilities with robustness as a proactive dimension.  
Clearly these factors need more precise and parsimonious meanings. When 
definitions are inconsistent they vary in operationalizations. Consistency is required to 
identify significant relationships among variables (O'Leary-Kelly & J. Vokurka, 1998; 
Schwab, 1980). Likewise, ambiguity results in confusing and contradictory outcomes and 
lack the capability to advance theory (Flynn & Flynn, 2004; Rosenzweig & Roth, 2004).  
We find evidence of contradictory results in relationships between supply chain risk 
management capabilities and supply chain risk management For example, integration has 
been considered key to  supply chain risk management  (Frohlich & Westbrook, 2001; 
Leuschner, Rogers, & Charvet, 2013; Manuj & Mentzer, 2008b; Ponomarov & Holcomb, 
2009) yet contrary evidence was found by Wieland and Wallenburg (2013). They found 
that only communication and cooperation were necessary. They operationalize integration 
as distinct from communication and cooperation, however, while other studies 
operationalize communication and cooperation as dimensions of integration (Flynn, Huo, & 
Zhao, 2010; Leuschner et al., 2013).  
Precise and parsimonious construct definitions are required for accurate 
measurement of variables and their relationships (O'Leary-Kelly & J. Vokurka, 1998; 
Schwab, 1980). The inconsistency in definitions and operationalization of supply chain risk 
management constructs has likely contributed to the contradictory research results. In fact, 
in their review of supply chain resilience, Hohenstein et al. (2015) found the lack of 
alignment regarding required capabilities to hinder our understanding.  
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Similarly, links between supply chain risk management and performance outcomes 
are not well understood. Traditional manufacturing efforts focus on productivity and 
efficiency sometimes at a contrast to marketing or business strategy (Skinner, 1969). For 
instance, Simchi-Levi, Schmidt, and Wei (2014) found that firms often prioritize their 
supply chain risk management by annual spend, although spend is not correlated with 
company performance. Firms then remain vulnerable, because low cost commodity 
suppliers were overlooked. Traditional cost calculations consider proactive capabilities as 
costly when an incident does not occur. However, when factoring in the avoidance of losses, 
the lack of any disruption could be considered savings. In fact a recent study found that 
obtaining top management support for investments is one of the key challenges to supply 
chain risk management (Glendon & Bird, 2013). Prior disruption experience has been 
shown to improve supply chain risk management performance suggesting that firms must 
endure a disruptive event prior to recognizing its value (Bode et al., 2011).  
Once a firm recognizes the need for supply chain risk management, they lack 
understanding in practice of which capabilities have the greatest effect. Elkins et al. (2005) 
found firms consistently stated the need for processes dealing with disruptions. More 
recently, a 2011 study found that still only 10% of firms had specific plans for mitigating a 
supply chain disruption (Black et al.). Firmly establishing empirical links between supply 
chain risk management capabilities and performance outcomes may help gain the strategic 
recognition it needs for appropriate top management support. 
Contributing further to our lack of consensus is the abundance of conceptual 
frameworks unsupported by empirical work (Van Der Vegt, Essens, Wahlström, & George, 
2015). Many qualitative reviews have been conducted in an attempt to organize them, 
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(Durach et al., 2015; Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009; Sodhi et al., 2012) but no systematic 
quantitative review has yet been conducted.  
We argue that the supply chain risk management field needs a quantitative 
synthesis of empirical studies in order to generate consensus and point future work toward 
areas which can resolve these issues (Humphrey, 2011; Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). Thus, the 
purpose of this study is to clarify the lack of consensus regarding which constructs are the 
most effective to supply chain risk management, the relationships among them, and which 
combinations are positively related to performance. It is by understanding the 
interrelationships that will help practitioners and academics transition from conducting 
risk management activities to improving resiliency (Van Der Vegt et al., 2015). The 
research questions, therefore, are which capabilities have the greatest effect on supply 
chain risk management performance? Which combinations lead toward superior firm 
performance?  
We therefore undertake a meta-analysis of empirical supply chain risk management 
work. It focuses on the direction and magnitude of effects, not the statistical significance. A 
meta-analysis can help gain consensus, resolve conflicts and increase generalizability by 
aggregating multiple individual studies (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). It provides direction for 
future streams of research by pointing to gaps in the literature and identifying the presence 
of unknown moderators.  
This research makes several contributions. First we study the classification of 
capabilities of and relationships between proactive and reactive supply chain risk 
management capabilities. Second, we find antecedents and moderators of supply chain risk 
management and firm performance. Third, we evaluate the relationship between supply 
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chain risk management and firm performance. Lastly, future work is identified to help drive 
future work in those areas of need. 
 2.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
Figure 1: Supply Chain Risk Theoretical Model 
2.2.1 Paradox theory 
We utilize paradox theory to analyze capabilities and their relations. Figure 1 above 
illustrates the overall theoretical model. A paradox is an condition based upon two 
persistent opposing elements which each have merit individually yet seem incompatible 
taken together (Poole & Van de Ven, 1989). Paradox theory suggests that what first may 
appear as a tradeoff may not be. Digging further into competing strategies could reveal 
relationships enabling their integration (Poole & Van de Ven, 1989). As opposed to 
compromising “some bland halfway point between one extreme or the other”, paradox 
theory suggests that tensions are “two sides of the same coin” (Eisenhardt, 2000; Lewis, 
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2000). By simultaneously engaging in contradictory strategies, firms may gain synergies 
between them (March, 1991).  
We classify supply chain risk management capabilities according to proactive and 
reactive capabilities. We hypothesize that capabilities in the preparation and prevention 
phase of the supply chain risk management process enable greater supply chain risk 
management. Preparation and prevention of a supply chain disruption will preclude 
associated losses and improve supply chain risk management performance. Qualitative 
literature reviews have summarized anticipation and resistance (Kamalahmadi & Parast, 
2016) and readiness (Ho, Zheng, Yildiz, & Talluri, 2015) to enable supply chain resilience. 
More specifically,  Tukamuhabwa, Stevenson, Busby, and Zorzini (2015) identifies 17 
proactive capabilities for supply chain resilience in their literature review. 
H1: Proactive risk management capabilities have a positive relationship to supply chain 
risk management performance. 
 We hypothesize that capabilities in the response and recovery phase of the supply 
chain risk management process enable greater supply chain risk management. Responding 
to a supply chain disruption will reduce the associated propagation and impact improving 
supply chain risk management performance. Recovery after a supply chain disruption ends 
the disruption and any associated propagation or losses, therefore improving supply chain 
risk management. Literature reviews, have also found recovery and response (Ho et al., 
2015; Kamalahmadi & Parast, 2016) to contribute to supply chain resilience. In their 
literature review, Tukamuhabwa et al. (2015) identifies 11 different reactive capabilities 
for improving supply chain resilience. 
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H2: Reactive risk management capabilities have a positive relationship to supply chain risk 
management performance.  
We also hypothesize that supply chain risk management will enable greater firm 
performance. Successful management of supply chain risks should increase revenues 
because disruptions to the marketplace are fewer and of less significant impact. Likewise, 
successful management of supply chain risks should decrease expenses as recovery costs 
are minimized. Wieland and Wallenburg (2012) examined both proactive (robust) and 
reactive (agile) capabilities and their relationship with supply chain risk management and 
business performance found that only proactive (robust) capabilities had a statistically 
significant relationship. The literature review by Ho et al. (2015) find that significant 
relationships exist between supply chain risk management processes and call for work 
incorporating multiple components. Ghadge, Dani, and Kalawsky (2012) also note the need 
for holistic work including both proactive and reactive strategies.  
H3: Supply chain risk management has a positive relationship with firm performance. 
Tradeoffs 
Although studies acknowledge that some level of both proactive and reactive 
strategies may need to be employed they are not recognized as potential 
complementarities and often framed as tradeoffs to be compromised (Chopra & Sodhi, 
2004; Norrman & Jansson, 2004; Thun & Hoenig, 2011; Yang & Yang, 2010). In a tradeoff, 
one is at the expense of the other (Skinner, 1969). Tradeoffs occur when competing 
priorities exist like risk reduction and efficiency. Preparation for a disruption can be costly 
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when a disruption does not occur, therefore, some firms rely on responses to actual 
disruptions (Christopher & Peck, 2004). Inefficiencies or compromises are expected to 
occur when conducting both (Fiksel, 2003; Pettit, Fiksel, & Croxton, 2010; Wagner & Bode, 
2008; Yang & Yang, 2010).  
Plants have limited resources so managers attempt to maximize efficiency by 
choosing to focus on the development of a few selected capabilities (Hayes & Wheelwright, 
1984; Norrman & Jansson, 2004). Imagine a potential supplier selection decision. A firm 
with a proactive strategy may select the most reliable supplier to prevent a disruption. A 
firm with a reactive strategy, on the other hand, may select the lowest cost supplier so that 
safety stock inventories can be maintained. Tradeoffs are demonstrated by a recent study 
on the relationship between collaboration and flexibility (Scholten & Schilder, 2015). 
Relation specific investments in mutually dependent relationships enable collaboration and 
increased supply chain resilience. However, this increases costs of the flexibility in utilizing 
an alternative supplier. We therefore test paradox theory by exploring the alternative 
potential of tradeoffs between risk management capabilities and outcomes. 
H4a: Proactive risk management capabilities have a negative relationship to reactive risk 
management capabilities. 
Complementarities 
In a meta-analysis on manufacturing tradeoffs, Rosenzweig and Easton (2010) 
found tradeoffs in priorities and strategies but not capabilities. This suggests that many 
supply chain risk management capabilities may in fact be paradoxes not tradeoffs. With the 
proper priorities, strategies and metrics, organizations could enable dynamic decision 
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making consistent with the alignment of both domains (Smith, 2014). Paradox theory 
explains complex systems better than contingency theory which focuses on a small number 
of variables, because paradox theory assumes that tensions exist in complex systems 
(Smith, 2014). Echoing the call of Matthews, Power, Touboulic, and Marques (2016) for 
greater use of a paradox lens, supply chain risk management research may develop further 
by examining the dualities as opposed to attempting to capture all of the contingencies 
involved in complex systems.  
Some research has attempted to combine seemingly opposing supply chain risk 
management capabilities through a temporal lens based on their application in the supply 
chain risk management process. Ponomarov and Holcomb (2009) developed the most 
parsimonious capability model with three phases of readiness, response and recovery. 
Others have elaborated four (Hohenstein et al., 2015), five (Manuj & Mentzer, 2008b; Sáenz 
& Revilla, 2014), and eight separate phases (Sheffi & Rice Jr, 2005) to classify and integrate 
supply chain risk management capabilities. The problem with these, as Tukamuhabwa et al. 
(2015) points out is that several capabilities may be planned proactively yet enacted 
reactively making process-based, temporal classifications “gray” or confusing.  
Research has considered the potential complementarity of supply chain risk 
management capabilities. After conducting a literature review, Ghadge et al. (2012) 
propose taking a holistic risk management approach including both proactive and reactive 
strategies. They found the approach lacking in the literature, but argue this would result in 
more relevant models. Congruent to the argument that capabilities are applied at multiple 
times throughout the risk management process, Ho et al. (2015) argue that  supply chain 
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risk management processes are inter-related and a comprehensive review of strategy 
selection and joint impact is needed.  
Wieland and Wallenburg (2013) found synergies between proactive and reactive 
strategies from supply chain visibility. In addition to supply chain risk management, 
Norrman and Jansson (2004) noticed that tools developed for supply chain risk 
management were being used for other business purposes providing more firm benefits. 
These initial findings support the argument based in paradox theory. A holistic approach to 
risk management which embraces paradoxical tensions may reveal the complementarities 
of constructs resulting in even greater resiliency.  
Paradox theory has rarely been applied in supply chain but a well-known example 
from other domains is ambidexterity. Ambidextrous firms simultaneously engage in 
exploration and exploitation (Ashforth, Rogers, Pratt, & Pradies, 2014; Tushman & O Reilly, 
1996). The most innovative firms view exploitation of existing resources and exploration of 
new opportunities both as necessary and thus jointly manage (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 
2009). We similarly argue that supply chain resiliency requires the joint management of 
both proactive and reactive risk management capabilities. We therefore test paradox 
theory by exploring the potential complementarity between proactive and reactive supply 
chain risk management capabilities and outcomes. 
H4b: Proactive risk management capabilities have a positive relationship to reactive risk 
management capabilities. 
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2.2.2 Contingency theory 
Contingency theory proposes that no best practice is universally applicable. Firm 
differences are due to contextual contingencies in the firm environment. The role of 
management, according to contingency theory, is that of choosing strategies appropriate 
for their unique situation (Ketokivi, 2006). Managerial choice in strategy is the means by 
which a firm can control its environment (Doty, Glick, & Huber, 1993). Superior firm 
performance is associated with the firm whose strategies enable the best fit with their 
contextual contingencies (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Insights into firm differences can 
therefore be gained by looking at the effect of contextual differences on various strategies 
(Hofer, 1975).  
The impact of supply chain risk management on firm performance varies so we use 
contingency theory to investigate contextual differences affecting that relationship. We 
explore integration, firm culture, industry clockspeed and disruption types as potential 
moderators of the relationship between supply chain risk management and firm 
performance. 
Integration 
Supply chain integration is the extent of engagement with suppliers (Frohlich & 
Westbrook, 2001) and therefore includes dimensions of information sharing (Rai, 
Patnayakuni, & Seth, 2006), collaboration, coordination (Mackelprang, Robinson, 
Bernardes, & Webb, 2014).  Information sharing has been shown to relate positively to 
supply chain flexibility in both proactive and reactive supply chain risk management (Lee, 
Padmanabhan, & Whang, 1997; Mohr & Nevin, 1990; Skipper & Hanna, 2009). Wieland and 
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Wallenburg (2013) found that it is the relational aspect of information sharing that is more 
important than integration. Alternatively, visibility of information has been cited as the 
most beneficial. Lack of visibility to supplier information resulted in capacity related 
disruptions hampering the ability to grow the business (Panchak, 2013).  
Network collaboration and coordination could help predict and identify capacity 
constraints. Collaboration has been defined as a mutual process of shared understanding 
and vision to integrate resources for accomplishing shared goals (Richey, Adams, & Dalela, 
2012). Thus, collaboration and coordination by all network partners is necessary in order 
to be effective. This requires a match in understanding, needs and capabilities and makes 
achieving collaboration so challenging (Richey et al., 2012). Collaboration has been found 
to enable the coexistence of both cooperation and competitive behavior which enabled 
greater information sharing simultaneously with greater vigilance towards opportunism 
(Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, & Bagherzadeh, 2014). 
Bridging is a similar term for comprehensive boundary spanning actions which link 
firms with an exchange partner. Boundary spanning actions attempt to reduce information 
uncertainty (Bode et al., 2011). These linkages have been shown to improve visibility, 
agility, supply chain performance, and mediate supply chain risk (Barratt & Oke, 2007; 
Brandon‐Jones et al., 2014; Christopher, 2000; Mabert & Venkataramanan, 1998).  
Integration in moderate levels is expected to enable collaborative supplier relations, 
facilitate information sharing and visibility, thereby reducing uncertainty of supplier risks. 
We hypothesize, however, an inverted U shaped relationship. Insufficient levels of 
integration would provide little collaboration, information sharing or visibility and be 
inadequate in reducing the uncertainty of supplier risks. Low levels of integration are 
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expected to hamper the ability of supply chain risk management to improve firm 
performance. Low levels of integration lack the joint coordination necessary for efficient 
and effective response to disruption (Scholten & Schilder, 2015). Likewise, very high levels 
of integration may create excessive supplier dependencies and rigidities reducing the 
flexibility and agility of supply chain risk management. In fact, Villena, Revilla, and Choi 
(2011) found an inverted U shape in buyer-supplier relationships. Very high levels of 
integration are expected to hamper the ability of supply chain risk management to improve 
firm performance. 
H5: Integration has a moderating relationship between supply chain risk management and 
firm performance. 
H5a: Moderate levels of integration will have a positive moderating effect on the 
relationship between supply chain risk management and firm performance. 
H5b: High and low levels of integration will have a negative moderating effect on the 
relationship between supply chain risk management and firm performance. 
Organizational culture 
Organizational culture partly determines the flexibility, responsiveness and agility 
which organizations utilize to mitigate and respond to supply chain disruptions 
(Braunscheidel & Suresh, 2009). For example, firms may focus supply chain risk 
management on key suppliers as opposed to balancing efforts across more regularly used 
low cost commodities (Simchi-Levi et al., 2014). 
Some companies have created a culture of flexibility emphasizing soft skills such as 
communication and training which have shown to contribute to supply chain resilience 
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(Blackhurst et al., 2011; Christopher & Peck, 2004; Sheffi, 2005). This requires commitment 
from leadership encouraging change capabilities and innovation and has been 
demonstrated to impact firm performance (Akgün & Keskin, 2014; Ates & Bititci, 2011; 
Camisón & Villar López, 2010; Demmer, Vickery, & Calantone, 2011; Golgeci & Ponomarov, 
2013). Similarly, culture can impact the valuation of tradeoffs between investment in 
flexible capabilities and their associated costs which is critical in determining the level of 
commitment toward supply chain risk management (Christopher & Holweg, 2011; Elkins et 
al., 2005; Kamalahmadi & Parast, 2016).  
Other capabilities the organization has committed to develop can also influence 
supply chain risk management such as the ability to process information, continuously 
improve and innovativeness (Elkins et al., 2005; Skipper & Hanna, 2009). In fact, Fine 
(2000) argues that the capabilities a firm chooses to develop is the most important 
competitive strategy. Senge (1999) argues that unless organizations have the motivation 
and capacity to change they will not address deeper issues and crises will be repeated. 
Similarly, organizational culture can impede collaboration (Richey et al., 2012). Motivation 
and capability to change stem from cultural norms about appropriate levels of risk and 
spending (Senge, 1999; Zsidisin & Wagner, 2010). Leadership commitment is required for 
effective implementation (Durach et al., 2015). 
In developing contingency plans, Ketokivi (2006) points out that each location will 
respond uniquely to the volume variation, product mix and technology changes in its own 
environment more so than at the firm level. In their study, Kim and Tomlin (2013) found 
that decentralized firms were more likely to focus on responses to actual disruptions, 
overinvesting in capacity, while centralized firms utilize more preventive strategies. 
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Decentralized firms with excess capacity experience shorter internal capacity related 
disruptions and develop fewer prevention capabilities (Kim & Tomlin, 2013) which may 
make them more vulnerable to supplier related disruptions. In fact, they suggest that 
decentralized firm cultures are more tolerant of exposure to externally related disruptions 
as they perceive diffused responsibility and involvement. 
In summary, organizational culture has the capacity to affect strategies, capability 
development, norms, and leadership commitment. The influence of various organizational 
cultures has the ability to strengthen or weaken the ability of supply chain risk 
management to effect firm performance. 
H6: Organizational culture types a) centralization b) continuous improvement c) flexible d) 
innovation e) learning and f) supply chain risk management have a positive moderating 
relationship between supply chain risk management and firm performance.  
Industry clockspeed 
The industry environment influences the strategies of firms competing in that 
environment (Fine, 1998). Clockspeed is an environmental characteristic described as the 
industry rate of product, process, and structural change (Fine, 1998). Industry rate of 
change includes both internal and network partners. Product change is the pace of new 
product introductions and technological innovation. Process change includes lean 
practices, concurrent engineering and design for manufacturing. Structural change is the 
composition of firms within the industry as well as the vertical or horizontal structure of 
networks in the market.  
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Supply chain risk management is impacted by contingencies in environmental 
characteristics (Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005). The relationship between customers and 
suppliers increases with higher rates of industry clockspeed and improves performance 
(Chavez, Gimenez, Fynes, Wiengarten, & Yu, 2013). Inventory buffers are used more 
frequently in higher clockspeed industries (Meijboom, Voordijk, & Akkermans, 2007). 
Likewise, lean practices were found to be efficient and have a positive impact on flexibility 
under conditions of low clockspeed (Meijboom et al., 2007).  
Managers often use industry clockspeed to benchmark the acceptable level of firm 
change (Carrillo, 2005). The planned rate of mitigation, however, may not be appropriate 
for the rate of change required during a disruption (Greening & Rutherford, 2011). If the 
industry pace of change outpaces firm adaptation capability, it will be less likely to 
successfully recover from disruptions.  
High industry clockspeed introduces higher rates of change into the supply chain 
environment. Higher rates of change in a supply chain network corresponds with more 
turbulence and vulnerability to supply chain disruptions. Turbulence can negatively impact 
supplier relations, require higher safety stocks and make lean practices inefficient. Higher 
turbulence requires greater adaptive capabilities of supply chain risk management. 
H7: High industry clockspeed has a negative moderating relationship between supply chain 
risk management and firm performance. 
Disruption classification 
Turbulence can also be introduced via natural disasters, labor strike, political unrest 
or pandemic related trade bans (Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005; Sheffi, 2001). However, 
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catastrophic risks are both less frequent and more severe. Wagner and Bode (2008) found 
catastrophic events to have an insignificant impact on supply chain performance and 
suggested focusing on the more frequent “every-day” supply chain disruptions which are 
more significant to supply chain performance. “Every-day” supply chain disruptions are 
more commonly associated with issues regarding demand uncertainty (Kleindorfer & Saad, 
2005).  
High and low impact disruptions have been shown to impact firms differently. While 
effective resource management may mitigate low impact disruptions, high impact 
disruptions require the capability to quickly adapt and reconfigure resources (Ambulkar, 
Blackhurst, & Grawe, 2015). Catastrophic disruptions, therefore, are expected to have a 
negative effect because most supply chains are designed for efficient “every-day” operation 
and lack the capabilities to quickly adapt (Christopher & Holweg, 2011; Hendricks & 
Singhal, 2005; Sáenz & Revilla, 2014). In fact, Greening and Rutherford (2011) 
operationalize disruption by the development of a post event change in network structure.  
H8: Severe (a) and uncontrollable source (b) disruption types have a negative moderating 
relationship between supply chain risk management and firm performance. 
2.3 Method 
The random effects meta-analytic procedure followed guidelines suggested by 
Hunter and Schmidt (2004). This method is broadly used in business because it relies upon 
correlational data which is usually available in business research due to the common use of 
surveys. Because meta-analysis corrects for many statistical artifacts in original studies, it 
has been shown to produce more accurate population estimates with less biased effects 
(Field, 2001). The meta-analytic process can be summarized by three basic steps: 1) search 
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for and gather studies 2) extract and code information from studies and 3) apply meta-
analysis to the extracted information. 
2.3.1 Selection process 
The search process gathered studies through a Thomas Reuter’s Web of Science all 
database search.  Due to an interest in being comprehensive and inconsistencies in 
determining quality, all journals were included, not just the upper echelon (Lipsey & 
Wilson, 2001). No time constraints were imposed. The following search terms were used: 
“supply chain agility”, “supply chain disruption”, “supply chain flexibility”, “supply chain 
glitch”, “supply chain disruption recovery”, “supply chain mitigation”, “supply chain 
resilience”, “supply chain resiliency”, “supply chain risk”, “supply chain robustness”, and 
“supply chain vulnerability”. A dissertation search was conducted in ABI Inform. Manual 
searches were also conducted by reviewing citation lists and related meta-analyses on 
supply chain integration and flexibility. The compiled search returned an initial sample size 
of 1,221 studies. 
The first step of the selection process was paper availability. Due to the inclusion of 
all journals, 68 papers were unable to be located with the aid of interlibrary loan library 
services.  
All available studies were reviewed for the content. We removed 1,049 papers 
which had no empirical data on the constructs and relationships of interest. This 
eliminated simulations, patents, meta-analysis, multivariate analysis, conceptual 
frameworks and literature reviews. This included removing studies involving supply chain 
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risk management antecedents which related directly to firm performance and not supply 
chain risk management. This resulted in 104 plausible studies. 
It is the standardization from using a common effect size statistic which allows for 
the meta-analysis because they are interpretable in a consistent fashion. The pooled 
estimate provides greater statistical power than the individual studies.  Therefore data 
were scrutinized closer for common data. Only correlational data or data convertible to r 
were considered. Studies were required to contain the number of participants so that effect 
sizes could be weighted. Reliability data is needed to correct for sampling and 
measurement error. Common data requirements eliminated 17 studies.  
Four redundant studies were also rejected. When dissertations or conference 
proceedings were later published in a peer reviewed journal, the journal paper was 
retained and the earlier work eliminated. A sample size of 83 were coded.   
Correction for artifacts cannot be conducted on single papers. Therefore, if a 
relationship was expressed in only one study, those relationships and corresponding 
studies were excluded. This final selection step disqualified another 41 studies. The final 
sample size was reduced to 42. The sample selection results are displayed in table 1. Great 
care was taken to capture all relevant studies and any omission is unintentional.  
Library services and emails to authors were utilized to find English versions of all 
papers. Those remaining papers were translated with google translate for appropriateness 
of fit. Five papers appeared to have potentially relevant relationships which were then 
reviewed and translated by a Ph.D. student in statistics whose native language matched 
that used in the paper. This ensured accurate understanding of the operationalization of 
constructs and the data presented.  
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Table 1: Sample Selection 
 
2.3.2 Coding of variables 
The second meta-analysis step was to extract coded variables from the remaining 
studies which pertain to the research question and possessed the necessary data. These 
descriptive statistics can then be combined to reveal essential relationships of accumulated 
data. A total of 395 item level variable codes were initially created. Two categorical 
variables were created for industry and country.  
Individual items were aggregated represent broader, related constructs. These 
broader constructs enable greater generalization than the context specific individual 
studies. The coding protocol was performed jointly by two authors with subject matter 
expertise. In the occasion when an items name and operationalization resulted in two 
different categorizations, the actual measurement was used for coding. This reduced the 
constructs to 106 unique aggregate variables. Supply chain risk management performance 
Data 
Plausibility
•1,221 Initial sample size
•(68) Unavailable papers
•(1,049) Lack of empirical data on constructs of interest
Data 
Commonality
•104 Plausible papers
•(17) Lack of participant numbers, correlational or data convertible to r, and 
reliability data
•(4) Redundant papers
Data 
Sufficiency
•83 Unique papers with data 
•(41) Papers with an insufficient number of relationships to correct 
correlations
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was conceptualized as supply chain risk, resilience, robustness and disruption management 
performance. Disruption management was operationalized as frequency of disruption and 
negative impact. Since disruption management was operationalized as a negative 
relationship it was reverse coded to aggregate with the other positive relationships. Firm 
performance was conceptualized as firm, market and profit performance. Table 2 lists the 
papers used and which aggregations were created.   
Table 2. Papers Used In Meta-Analysis 
                                                                                              
 
 
 
 
Author P
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SC
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(Ambulkar et al., 2015) X X   X 
(Brandon‐Jones et al., 2014) X X    
(Cai, Liu, Huang, Liang, & Shen, 2014)   X   
(Cantor, Blackhurst, Pan, & Crum, 2014)   X   
(Cantor, Blackhurst, & Cortes, 2014)  X    
(Cho, 2013) X     
(Ellinger, Chen, Tian, & Armstrong, 2015) X  X  X 
(Golgeci & Ponomarov, 2013) X X   X 
(Gölgeci & Ponomarov, 2015) X     
(Graeml & Peinado, 2014)     X 
(Ha & Park, 2013) X X    
(Kern, Moser, Hartmann, & Moder, 2012) X X   X 
(Kim, 2014) X X X X  
(Kim, 2010)    X X 
(Kim, 2004) X X X   
(Kim & Kwon, 2013) X X X X X 
(Kim & Kwon, 2012) X     
(Kim & Kwon, 2011) X X X X X 
(Kim, Park, & Jo, 2015) X X  X X 
(Kim, Yang, & Seok, 2012) X X X X  
(Koçoğlu, İmamoğlu, İnce, & Keskin, 2011)   X   
(Lee, 2010) X  X   
(Lee & Rha, 2016) X X X X  
(Lehnert, Zentes, & Schramm-Klein, 2013) X X  X  
(Li, Fan, Lee, & Cheng, 2015)   X   
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Table 2 continued 
(Merschmann & Thonemann, 2011) X X    
(Park, 2011) X X X   
(Riley, 2013) X X X X X 
(Rosenzweig, Roth, & Dean, 2003)   X   
(Sanchez Torres, 2012) X X X   
(Shao, 2013) X X X   
(Su, 2011) X     
(Sylla et al., 2014)  X    
(Viswanathan, 2011) X X    
(Voss & Williams, 2013) X   X  
(Wagner & Bode, 2008)    X  
(Wieland & Wallenburg, 2012) X X  X  
(Wieland & Wallenburg, 2013)   X   
(Yang, 2014)   X   
(Yang, Wu, & Li, 2009) X X X   
(Zhao, Huo, Sun, & Zhao, 2013)   X   
(Zsidisin & Wagner, 2010) X X    
 
2.3.3 Meta-analytic procedure 
The third step applied the meta-analytic procedure to the extracted and coded 
information. The Hunter and Schmidt method progressively makes corrections for 
individual study variances (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). The correlation statistic, r, was used 
due to its wide availability. Sample weighted averages were made to each individual study. 
Then random variation due to sample size was corrected. Next, variances in independent 
and dependent variables were corrected for measurement error by multiplying by an 
attenuation factor calculated from the construct reliabilities. Missing reliability data were 
imputed with average reliability (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). Variances were corrected by 
subtracting artifact errors. Consistency was thereby gained by correcting for measurement 
and sampling errors. The combined and corrected results are more generalizable to the 
“true” population.  
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The Hunter and Schmidt method utilize these measures over significance testing 
which does not describe if the variance is large enough to worry about or distinguish 
between variance due to uncorrected artifacts or moderators. Moderator variables were 
analyzed by a Chi-Square test for systemic variation and the 75% rule of thumb. Error 
variances explained by artifact correction < 75% are considered to indicate missing 
moderators (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). Formulas are displayed in table 3. 
Data were first manually analyzed with Excel to become familiar with the detailed 
data. Then, established scripts (Field & Gillett, 2010) of the  Hunter and Schmidt method 
were run through SPSS for effect size estimates and magnitude of differences for 
moderator analysis. Study output results in a population estimate and both credibility and 
confidence intervals. 
Analysis was conducted in three stages. The first stage analyzed items relating to 
supply chain risk management performance. The second stage analyzed supply chain risk 
management performance to broader firm performance outcomes. The third stage 
conducted subgroup analysis with a random effects regression analysis and chi square test 
for potential moderators. 
Table 3. Meta-Analysis Formulas 
Correction for Sampling Error: 
Weighted Mean Effect Size (r̅w) 
 
Total Observed Variance 
 
Sampling Error Variance 
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Table 3 continued 
Residual Population Variance 
 
Upper and Lower Credibility Intervals 
 
 
 
Correction for Measurement Error: 
Attenuation Factor  
A =  
Corrected Estimated Population Mean (r̅c) 
 
 
Corrected Standard Deviation of 
Population Correlation 
 
Upper and Lower Confidence Intervals 
 
Measurement Error Variance S22 = Var(r̅c*A) 
Moderator Identification: 
Explained Variance ((σ2e+ S22)/S2r̅) * 100% 
Chi-Square Homogeneity  
 
 
2.4 Results 
For each meta-analysis we present the following results: the number of independent 
samples (k), uncorrected sample-weighted mean effect size (r), the combined total sample 
size (n), corrected effect size (ρ), credibility intervals using standard deviation (CV), 
confidence intervals using standard error (CI), and the % of variance explained by artifacts 
(%ARTV) for the effect of hypothesized relationships (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). Positive 
effect sizes indicate positive relationships The rule of thumb is that effect sizes of 0.1 are 
considered small, effect sizes at least 0.25 are of medium significance and those greater 
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than 0.4 are largely significant (Cohen, 1977, 1988). Credibility intervals express 
magnitude of the population variance and indicate there is an 80% chance the mean lies 
within the interval. Wider CVs are less reliable. Confidence intervals reflect precision of the 
mean and indicate the range of the mean true score. Intervals containing zero are 
considered to potentially have a true mean effect of zero and are therefore not supported. 
Explained variances above 75% are generally considered free from large moderator effects 
(Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). Those less than 75% indicate that other variables contributing 
to outcomes are missing. Most of the relationships in this study have %ARTV less than 75% 
suggesting that more complex relationships should be studied in the future. 
2.4.1 Paradox or tradeoff 
The division of capabilities to proactive or reactive strategies was made according to 
previous work utilizing that classification. These studies are summarized in table 8 
(Braunscheidel & Suresh, 2009; Chang, Ellinger, & Blackhurst, 2015; Chopra & Sodhi, 2004; 
Ghadge et al., 2012; Gunasekaran & Yusuf, 2002; Hohenstein et al., 2015; Knemeyer, Zinn, & 
Eroglu, 2009; Thun & Hoenig, 2011; Tukamuhabwa et al., 2015; Wieland & Wallenburg, 
2013; Zsidisin, Ellram, Carter, & Cavinato, 2004). A summary of proactive and reactive 
meta-analytic results are presented in table 4 below. Both hypothesis 1 and 2 are 
supported. Proactive capabilities had a large effect (ρ = .461) and the intervals did not 
contain zero (CV = .26 - .51; CI = .18 - .75). Reactive capabilities also had a large effect (ρ = 
.413) and the intervals did not contain zero (CV = .24 - .49; CI = .09 - .75).  
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Table 4. Proactive and Reactive Effects on Performance 
 
Proactive (ρ = .461) and reactive (ρ = .413) correlations have about the same effect 
on supply chain risk management performance. This would indicate that neither is 
preferable to the other but both can have a positive effect on supply chain risk management 
performance. Additionally, a regression analysis (β= .416) indicates that the relationship 
between proactive and reactive strategies are positive (table 5). This indicates they are not 
tradeoffs, but together both contribute to supply chain risk management performance. 
Therefore, hypothesis 4a is not supported. Consistent with paradox theory, hypothesis 4b 
is supported. 
Table 5. Proactive and Reactive Regression Analysis 
 
The credibility intervals are also very similar and nearly overlap (CV = .26-.51 & .24-
.49) indicating a lack of distinction between the two groups. Lack of discriminant validity is 
further supported by the poor model fit of the regression analysis, in table 5 (p = .272, p = 
.161, p = .625). P values of .00 - .01 are generally considered desirable (Griffeth, Hom, & 
Gaertner, 2000; Kong, Dirks, & Ferrin, 2014). One reason for the striking similarity between 
proactive and reactive is that many capabilities have been operationalized as proactive by 
some authors and reactive by others. Capabilities classified as both: agility, collaboration, 
communication, flexibility, redundancies, supplier development and visibility. This can be 
Bivariate Antecedent Relationships with SCRM 
Performance
k N r ρ
Lower 
80% CV 
Upper 
80% CV 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI
% ARTV
Proactive strategies with SCRM performance 105 18,124 0.383 0.461 0.26 0.51 0.18 0.75 10.7
Reactive strategies with SCRM performance 55 10,266 0.361 0.413 0.24 0.49 0.09 0.75 7.5
Direct Effects on Supply Chain Risk Management
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observed from the summary of past classifications (table 8.) Proactive strategies have been 
considered to be both capabilities to prevent supply chain disruption but also capabilities 
to reduce the impact of a disruption (Grötsch, Blome, & Schleper, 2013). Likewise, reactive 
strategies can be implemented before a disruption (Grötsch et al., 2013). Analysis revealed 
that capabilities classified as dual had a stronger effect size than either exclusively 
proactive or exclusively reactive capabilities (ρ= .475>). Firms may benefit most by 
focusing on dual capabilities.  
Table 6. Dual Capabilities Based Upon SCRM Process  
 
We argue that although the proactive and reactive classification has been a popular 
description of supply chain risk management capabilities (Grötsch et al., 2013), it may 
hamper progression of the field due to its lack of clarity and distinction. The fact that many 
variables overlap probably contributes to the synergistic nature of supply chain risk 
management. For example, supplier communication is likely to enable many firm 
capabilities such as cost and lead time reductions, and new product manufacturability. 
Although effect sizes are similar, we have studied proactive capabilities significantly more 
than reactive. Therefore, more research in responses to disruption would be important. 
The variance explained by most of the artifacts is less than 25% which indicates low 
heterogeneity and a large degree of unidentified potential moderators. 
Results in table 7 indicate that supply chain risk management strategies have a large 
and positive effect on business performance (ρ=.393) providing support for hypothesis 3. 
Bivariate Antecedent Relationships with SCRM 
Performance
k N r ρ
Lower 
80% CV 
Upper 
80% CV 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI
% ARTV
Dual proactive and reactive 46 8,067 0.404 0.475 0.28 0.53 0.22 0.73 12.27
Exclusively proactive 57 9,679 0.356 0.438 0.22 0.49 0.13 0.75 10.02
Exclusively reactive 8 1,652 0.284 0.325 0.16 0.41 -0.25 0.90 2.62
Direct Effects on Supply Chain Risk Management
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Surprisingly, however, the association with overall business performance (ρ= .393) was 
stronger than the association with supply chain performance (ρ = .243). These results 
suggest that supply chain risk management enables the avoidance of firm losses resulting 
in greater overall business performance. Firms cannot operate when the flow of products 
or services is interrupted. This positions supply chain risk management as a strategic core 
competency providing more value to the firm than to supply chain performance alone. This 
further supports the paradox theory of cumulative benefits of supply chain risk 
management capabilities. The almost perfect degree of variation attributed to the artifact 
(98.9% ARTV) likely indicates that supply chain performance is consistently 
operationalized across studies such as on time delivery. The fact that the effect size was 
moderate (ρ= .243) may indicate that on time delivery is an insufficient metric for 
explaining supply chain performance. For example many inefficiencies can be accrued in 
perfecting on time delivery. 
Table 7: Supply Chain Risk Management With Performance 
 
Table 8. Proactive and Reactive Classification 
Supply Chain  Risk 
Management 
Capabilities 
Papers 
Labeling 
Constructs 
Proactive  
Papers 
Labeling 
Constructs 
Reactive 
Supply Chain  Risk 
Management 
Capabilities 
Papers 
Labeling 
Constructs 
Proactive  
Papers 
Labeling 
Constructs 
Reactive 
Agility (visibility) (comm 
+ info= visibility, quick 
redesign, velocity) (flex, 
responsive, cost, qual) 
Gun02 
Tuk15 
Hoh15 
Wie13 
IT backup system   Thu11 
Aggregate (pool) demand 
for stability 
Cho04   Joint decision making  Hoh15 Hoh15 
  
Bivariate Antecedent Relationships with SCRM 
Performance
k N r ρ
Lower 
80% CV 
Upper 
80% CV 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI
% ARTV
SCRM performance with Business performance 9 2,175 0.354 0.393 0.24 0.46 0.17 0.61 11.6
SCRM performance with SC performance 5 1,440 0.201 0.243 0.09 0.31 0.23 0.25 98.9
Direct Effects on Supply Chain Risk Management
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Table 8 continued 
Collaboration 
(cooperation) (coord, 
joint dec, knowledge 
sharing, supplier cert, 
supplier dev) 
Tuk15 
Hoh15 
Gha12  
Tuk15 
Hoh15 
Joint planning     
Communication 
Zsi04 
Gun02 
Hoh15 
Knowledge management 
(gather & share) 
Tuk15 
Hoh15 
Hoh15 
Contingency planning 
Hoh15 
Kne09  
Zsi04 
Tuk15 
Gha12 
Logistics capabilities Tuk15 Tuk15 
Contractual agreements 
Tuk15 
Gha12 
  Low inventory levels     
Coordination 
(collaboration) 
Gha12 Hoh15 Monitoring 
Hoh15 
Gun02 
  
Coopetition Tuk15   Postponement 
Gha12 
Gun02 
  
Cross functional teams 
Hoh15 
Gun02 
Hoh15 
Previous disruption 
experience 
Hoh15 Hoh15 
Culture - learning 
orientation 
Gun02   Product design Gha12   
Culture - relational 
supplier management 
Gha12 
Thu11 
  
Public-private 
partnerships 
Tuk15   
Culture - risk 
management 
Tuk15 
Hoh15 
  Quality (high) Gun02    
Culture - top mgmt 
involvement 
Gun02   Redesign of network Hoh15 Gha12 
Customer responsiveness     Redundancy   
Tuk15 
Hoh15 
Thu11 
Delivery management Gha12   Resource shifting   Gha12 
Demand management 
(rerouting, pricing) 
  
Tuk15 
Gha12 
Responsiveness strategy 
(over cost) 
Cho04   
Demand planning 
(forecasting to identify 
supplier capacity 
constraints) 
Zsi04   Risk sharing  Gha12   
Detection of existing 
threats 
Hoh15   Robustness  Wie 12   
Dual/Multi source 
Hoh15 
Gha12 
Cho04 
Hoh15 
Thu11 
Safety stocks 
Hoh15 
Gha12 
Cho04 
Thu11 
Efficiency (facilities, 
equipment & design) 
Gun02   Security Tuk15   
Excess capacity 
Hoh15 
Cho04 
Hoh15 Social capital Tuk15 Tuk15 
Flexibility Cho04 
Tuk15 
Hoh15 
Thu11 
Strategic concentration 
on stable products 
(diversity bad), secure 
markets or areas 
Thu11   
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Table 8 continued 
Flexible labor Gun02 Hoh15 Supplier certification 
Hoh15 
Thu11 
Zsi04 
Hoh15 
Flexible multipurpose 
machinery 
    Supplier development 
Tuk15 
Hoh15 
Gha12 
Thu11 
Zsi04 
Hoh15 
Flexible order fulfillment     
Supplier dispersion 
(multiple locations) 
  Hoh15 
Flexible manufacturing Gun02 Hoh15 Supplier evaluations  Zsi04   
Flexible mix     Supplier selection 
Tuk15 Thu 
11  
  
Flexible supply base 
(switching) 
  Hoh15 
Supply chain network 
design 
Tuk15   
Flexible logistics   Hoh15 Sustainability compliance Tuk15   
Flexible volumes   Hoh15 Temporary alliances Gun02   
Identify & assess 
vulnerabilities 
Kne09   Training & education 
Hoh15 
Gun02 
Hoh15 
Information sharing 
(quality, relevance) 
interpretation? 
  Hoh15 Transparency (RFID) Thu11   
Innovativeness Tuk15   Velocity (speed)   Hoh15 
Integration  Gun02   
Visibility (demand & inv) 
(comm & info sharing) 
Tuk15  Hoh15 
Inventory management Tuk15   VMI Gha12   
IT use 
Tuk15 
Gun02 
Tuk15 
What if analysis 
scenarios 
Zsi04 Gha12 
 
2.4.2 Potential moderators 
Integration 
Data was insufficient for testing hypothesis 5, i.e., integration levels as a moderator 
between supply chain risk management and firm performance. Available relationships 
were analyzed for effect size of the various dimensions of integration. Previous research 
has reported mixed results regarding the value of integration. Ambiguity exists because 
communication and collaboration are both capabilities for achieving integration (Flynn et 
al., 2010; Leuschner et al., 2013).  Integration was coded as linkages enabling real time 
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exchange of data including databases and aligned goals. Combined integration was coded 
as integration, communication, collaboration and information sharing. None of the 
relations explained more than 75% of the variation, indicating that there are potential 
moderators excluded. Table 9 provides detail for aspects of integration as potential 
moderators. The greatest effect was found between integration and both supply chain risk 
management (ρ= .687) and supply chain performance (ρ = .546). This is consistent with 
findings from Flynn et al. (2010) that all of the dimensions of integration must be 
considered together because they each impact performance in a different way. Significant 
positive relationships were also found between overall factors such as combined 
integration and combined performance (ρ= .487) as well as more detailed factors of 
collaboration and supply chain risk management (ρ= .53). Collaboration was commonly 
defined as developing and executing plans and by relational variables such as teamwork, 
confidence, and trust. Collaboration had the greatest effect on supply chain risk 
management, supply chain and business combined performance (ρ= .572). This is likely 
due to the ability of collaboration to impact other aspects of the business besides supply 
chain risk management. Information sharing had smaller effects than either collaboration, 
integration or the combination of factors. The operationalization for information sharing 
included communication but emphasized a constant flow of data. There was insufficient 
data to test communication. Despite the difficulty in distinguishing collaboration and 
integration, they provide value to the firm above and beyond their relationship with supply 
chain risk management. This provides further support for firm synergies of risk 
management strategies and helps to resolve prior contradictory findings.  
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Table 9. Integration 
 
Organizational culture 
Data was insufficient to test hypothesis 6 as a moderator, however, data was 
available to test direct effects. Not surprisingly, a culture of supply chain risk management 
is the strongest relationship to supply chain risk management performance (ρ = .651). 
Combining supply chain and innovation cultures had an effect second only to supply chain 
risk management (ρ = .481) with no interval containing zero (CV = .33 - .53; CI = .29 - .67). 
This suggests that a culture of supply chain innovation may be an enabler of supply chain 
risk management. This is consistent with findings by Akgün and Keskin (2014) that 
innovativeness moderates the relationship between resilience and firm performance. 
Cultures associated with lean (learning, innovation and supplier relations) (Bortolotti, 
Boscari, & Danese, 2015; Dodgson, 1993) also had a strong effect on supply chain risk 
management (ρ = .439). This is interesting given that the low redundancies associated with 
lean have often been framed as a tradeoff with supply chain risk management (Ghadge et 
al., 2012; Tukamuhabwa et al., 2015; Wagner & Neshat, 2010). These findings indicate that 
other firm cultures to enable supply chain risk management. Consistent with paradox 
theory, this could be due to cumulative properties. 
Bivariate Relations with Integration and 
Performance
k N r ρ
Lower 
80% CV 
Upper 
80% CV 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI
% ARTV
Integration with SCRM Performance 8 1,637 0.564 0.687 0.47 0.66 0.55 0.83 22.2
Integration with SC Performance 7 1,690 0.43 0.546 0.33 0.55 0.35 0.74 17.0
Combined integration with SCRM Performance 19 3,619 0.451 0.540 0.34 0.56 0.32 0.76 13.8
Collaboration with SCRM Performance 4 538 0.455 0.530 0.32 0.59 0.47 0.59 72.0
Combined integration with SC Performance 11 2,176 0.402 0.505 0.28 0.52 0.21 0.80 9.9
Combined integration with Firm Performance 13 2,883 0.377 0.432 0.26 0.49 0.09 0.77 5.9
Information Sharing with SCRM Performance 7 1,444 0.322 0.385 0.20 0.44 0.24 0.53 29.3
Information Sharing with Firm Performance 4 944 0.254 0.066 0.13 0.37 -0.03 0.60 7.6
Direct Effects on Supply Chain Risk Management
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Firm culture is a moderator of supply chain risk management and should be 
explored further in future work. Future research in this area could help identify more 
synergies and moderators of supply chain capabilities. In addition to the limited number of 
cultural variables noted here, there may be other cultural variables moderating the 
relationship of supply chain risk management and performance such as continuous 
improvement, decentralization, empowerment, flexibility, leadership involvement or risk 
tolerance. 
Table 10. Organizational Culture
 
Industry clockspeed 
Although no relevant studies specific to industry clockspeed were found to test 
hypothesis 7, we have coded categorical industry control variables. Ten different dummy 
variables were created to represent various industries and an eleventh to represent mixed 
results from pooled industries. A random effects regression analysis was performed on the 
Fisher transformed means. Contrary to expectations, none of the models were improved by 
including the categorical variable industry. None of the p values for industry were in the 
desired range less than or equal to .05.  One possible explanation is that many of the studies 
reported pooled results from all industries diluting the detail. Another possible explanation 
is that many disruptions could equally impact multiple industries. Examples include 
natural disasters, port labor strikes, carrier bankruptcies or changes is trade regulations.  
Bivariate Relations with Culture and Performance
k N r ρ
Lower 
80% CV 
Upper 
80% CV 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI
% ARTV
SCRM Culture with SCRM Performance 4 810 0.565 0.651 0.47 0.66 0.35 0.96 5.1
Innovation and SC Culture with SCRM Performance 4 1,012 0.431 0.480 0.33 0.53 0.29 0.67 13.6
Learning, Innovation and Supplier Relations 9 1,265 0.36 0.439 0.22 0.50 0.24 0.63 25.4
Market and SC Culture with SCRM Performance 3 686 0.359 0.396 0.25 0.47 0.29 0.50 36.6
Innovation and Market Culture with SCRM Performance 7 746 0.28 0.349 0.10 0.46 0.26 0.44 72.2
Direct Effects of Supply Chain Risk Management
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Table 11. Industry and Country 
 
Country additional analysis 
Although not hypothesized we analyzed the available categorical information on 
country and found significant data (table 11). Similar to the industry data many studies 
ported results from pooled country data. Fourteen dummy variables were created to 
represent the 13 specific countries and mixed data. Country codes with sufficient data to be 
analyzed individually are presented in table 12. Similar to industry data, we might expect 
insignificance due to dilution of aggregated data, however, Wowak, Craighead, Ketchen, and 
Hult (2013) found the relationship between supply chain knowledge and performance with 
data collected in multiple countries stronger than with data collected from a single country. 
Contrary to the meta-analysis conducted by Wowak et al. (2013), we found insignificant 
effects in the mixed country data. 
A significant difference (table 11 ρ= .004) was found for country effects of proactive 
strategies effect on supply chain risk management performance. Interestingly given the 
similarities between proactive and reactive capabilities, there was no significance in 
reactive capabilities by country moderators (table 11 p = 0.078 > 0.05). This may indicate 
that there are very strong country differences in a firm’s ability to implement proactive risk 
management strategies. All capabilities were then combined and the effect of country 
Chi Square Test for Homogeneity with Potential 
Moderators
Model w/out 
Predictors p
Country χ2 df p Industry χ2 df p
Residual 
Variance χ2
df Full Model p
SCRM performance with Business Performance 0.000 1.3 3 0.718 0.2 1 0.694 7366.0 8 0.498
Proactive strategies with SCRM Performance 0.000 19.0 6 0.004 1.9 3 0.589 94.8 95 0.487
Reactive strategies with SCRM Performance 0.000 10.7 6 0.099 2.3 3 0.505 45.3 45 0.46
Flexible strategies with SCRM Performance 0.000 11.4 5 0.044 1.4 3 0.713 35.5 34 0.397
Combined integration with Combined Performance 0.000 6.9 6 0.332 4.9 3 0.178 37.4 35 0.358
Aggregate Practices with SCRM Performance 0.000 15.7 6 0.016 4.0 3 0.262 102.7 102 0.461
Model with PredictorsCategorical Predictors
Random Effects Regression Model Fit With Country and Industry Potential Moderators
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remained significant (p < 0.016). This indicates that dual capabilities not exclusive to one 
classification are significantly moderated by country.  
Upon finding significance by country we analyzed country specific data. Results are 
shown in table 12. We isolated each country individually and compared aggregate practices 
to the rest of the countries. Although none of the models were a good fit with industry 
predictors, they had significant group differences between each individual country. The 
greatest significant effects were from Korea (ρ= .003), Germany (ρ= .005), the US and UK 
(ρ= .013) and China (ρ= .038). We also assess each individual country in one model. 
Similarly, the model was a poor fit, but the country differences were the most significant 
(p= 0.000).  
Country differences could potentially be due to economic development, 
legal/regulatory, geographical or accessibility differences. Country differences were 
demonstrated in purchasing due to short/long term and individualist/collectivist 
orientations (Cannon, Doney, Mullen, & Petersen, 2010). Country cultural differences have 
been shown to affect negotiation ability (Ribbink & Grimm, 2014) and require cultural 
adaptation to mitigate supply chain relational risk (Jia & Rutherford, 2010). In summary, 
the effect of supply chain risk management on firm performance appears to be consistent 
regardless of country. However, consistent with contingency theory, global firms should 
not universally apply supply chain risk management but should vary and specify across 
countries.  
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Table 12. Additional Country Analysis 
 
Disruption types 
Disruption type data was insufficient for moderation testing of both hypothesis 8a 
and 8b. Risk source disruption data were available for direct effects and results are 
summarized in table 13. They are classified according to a framework of controllable, 
partially controllable and uncontrollable sources for each internal and external risks (Wu, 
Blackhurst, & Chidambaram, 2006). Controllable sources of risk had a small effect, however 
it is unreliable as the confidence interval includes 0. Partially and uncontrollable sources 
had even weaker effect sizes and zero in both their credibility and confidence intervals.  
When intervals contain zero it indicates that sometimes the relationship is positive 
and sometimes it is negative. Given the severity of differences in outcomes, it would be an 
important avenue of research to identify the moderator which determines the direction of 
effects. Future research should investigate potential contingencies which may result in 
differing direction of effects. For example, Brandon-Jones, Squire, and Van Rossenberg 
(2015) investigated the different placement of buffers to find that safety stock held at the 
supplier had positive effects on plant performance and disruptions while safety stock held 
at the plant had the opposite effects.  
Chi Square Test for Homogeneity with Potential Moderators
Model w/out 
Predictors p
 χ2 df p
Residual 
Variance χ2
df
Full 
Model p
Aggregate Practices with SCRM Performance All Countries 0.000 35.7 5 0.000 125.5 126 0.496
Aggregate Practices with SCRM Performance & S Korea 0.000 8.6 1 0.003 131.9 130 0.437
Aggregate Practices with SCRM Performance & Germany 0.000 8.4 1 0.004 132.0 130 0.435
Aggregate Practices with SCRM Performance & US 0.000 6.2 1 0.013 136.0 130 0.341
Aggregate Practices with SCRM Performance & UK 0.000 6.2 1 0.013 140.1 130 0.257
Aggregate Practices with SCRM Performance & S Korea 0.000 4.5 1 0.035 137.3 130 0.313
Aggregate Practices with SCRM Performance & China 0.000 4.3 1 0.038 137.7 130 0.305
Aggregate Practices with SCRM Performance & Mix 0.000 3.7 1 0.056 136.8 130 0.324
SCRM with Business Performance 0.000 1.5 3 0.678 8.1 9 0.52
Categorical Predictors Model with Predictors
Random Effects Regression Model Fit With Country Potential Moderators
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It is interesting that controllable and partially controllable sources of risk had a 
negative relationship with performance while uncontrollable sources had a positive 
relationship with performance. Although the results are unreliable and should be 
interpreted with caution, one explanation could be that firms successfully utilize buffers 
when they recognize uncontrollable risk more than they do for sources they feel they have 
some control over. Properly identifying risk is therefore likely a strong antecedent to 
successful supply chain risk management. 
Table 13. Sources of Disruption 
 
2.5 Discussion 
2.5.1 Theoretical contributions 
This study provides support for use of Paradox Theory in the domain of supply 
chain risk management. The paradox lens highlights the lack of distinctiveness in the 
common classification of proactive and reactive capabilities. An adequate classification is 
needed to develop new insight and progress the field of supply chain risk management.  
We find dual capabilities of agility, collaboration, communication, flexibility, 
redundancy and visibility, to have the most significant effect on supply chain risk 
management. We also find the construct of integration to provide the largest effect on 
supply chain risk management of any single capability. This helps to resolve the conflict 
Bivariate Relations with Integration and 
Performance
k N r ρ
Lower 
80% CV 
Upper 
80% CV 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI
% ARTV
Controllable sources with SCRM SC performance 2 913 -0 -0.216 -0.30 -0.08 -0.48 0.05 9.4
Partially controllable sources with SCRM & SC performance2 1,520 -0.02 -0.027 -0.09 0.05 -0.14 0.09 20.8
Uncontrollable sources with SCRM & SC performance 4 3,040 0.043 0.051 -0.03 0.05 -0.05 0.15 24.0
Moderator Effects of Supply Chain Risk Management
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effect of integration on supply chain risk and firm performance. This also points to the most 
significant variables to clearly operationalize and develop discriminant validity. 
Contingency Theory provides the framework for applying contextual differences to 
broader theories. This study demonstrates that capabilities leading to supply chain risk 
management and firm performance vary by firm culture, country and many other 
unidentified moderators. This study supports the contention of Contingency Theory that a 
blanket application of supply chain risk management capabilities cannot be prescribed for 
supply chain risk management performance, especially in a global context.  While these 
contributions are significant, it is important to note the extent of unexplained moderators 
in the analysis. For example, relationships which contain zero in the intervals are 
sometimes positive and sometimes negative. The contingencies which determine the 
direction of effect should be investigated as the outcome differences are significant.  
Results also show the synergy created for overall firm performance by supply chain 
risk management, especially dual capabilities. The effect of supply chain risk management 
is stronger for firm performance than supply chain performance. The avoidance of 
corresponding losses should be considered cost savings. Supply chain risk management 
should be given higher strategic priority.  
2.5.2 Managerial implications 
In agreement with Van Der Vegt et al. (2015) we advocate that a focus on 
vulnerabilities results in a view of risk mitigation as a cost to be justified. For example, 
while the ability to withstand a disruption has been argued to be a tradeoff with efficiency 
(Yang & Yang, 2010), we find that supply chain risk management contributes to overall 
firm performance. Likewise, Fiksel et al. (2015) find that cost reduction practices actually 
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increase vulnerability. Reorienting firm culture to a resilience approach based on the joint 
management of tensions may result in firm competitive advantage. This is supported by the 
strong effect of a supply chain risk management to firm performance.  
Based upon the correlations of integration with performance it would appear that 
the linkages between firms and suppliers may be as important as supply chain risk 
management to performance. Global firms must select supply chain capabilities specific to 
each country. The benefits of supply chain risk management to firm performance will be 
more universal.  
Firms may also find benefit in re-analyzing risk which they feel they have control or 
partial control over. Evidence suggests that firms may be overconfident in their ability to 
control supply chain risk. Additional strategic benefits may be found by incorporating a 
lean culture and supply chain innovation. Managers should not focus on actions to be taken 
in each step of the risk management process. We suggest a shifting perspective from action 
processes to decision making processes.  
2.6 Limitations 
This study is limited by the availability of primary studies. There are potential 
moderators which have not been captured which could explain relationships more 
precisely. It is also possible there are other papers which may be relevant but were not 
found due to our selection of keyword search terms. Other researchers could have utilized 
different selection criteria and perhaps obtained different results. For example, due to the 
use of correlational data, many other methods were excluded. In addition, correlation does 
not equal causation, hence, causal relations should not be inferred. 
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2.7 Future Research 
Rather than organizing supply chain risk management strategies by classifications 
which present confounding overlaps, a classification with greater discriminant validity 
needs to be developed. Clearly defined categories would enable consensus allowing future 
research to progress to more complex relationships incorporating potential moderators.  
Almost all of the tested relationships revealed significant moderators unaccounted 
for. Previous work has combined country results in a ‘melting pot’, however, reporting 
results by country from the same study may identify what factors need to be customized in 
each unique context. Research could be conducted to address the hypotheses which had 
insufficient data for testing, such as dimensions of integration and industry dimensions 
such as clockspeed. Additionally, while we have substantial supply chain risk management 
work in manufacturing or mixed settings, we know far less about process and service type 
settings. More empirical methods of research may reveal moderators not identified 
through those means. For example, utilization of more archival data sets could contribute 
new insights to supply chain risk management. 
This study also highlights numerous opportunities for future work to test variables 
already identified. For example, while postponement is theorized as way to respond to 
changes in demand and create opportunities for reconfiguration in the face of disruption 
(Yang & Yang, 2010) we found insufficient empirical data.  
Given that supply chain risk management strategies have synergistic benefits and 
impact on overall firm performance, future work should which interactions provide those 
benefits. 
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2.8 Summary 
This study introduces paradox theory to the field of supply chain risk management 
research. This theory offers explanatory power to complementary relationships which 
impact multiple performance measures. We find capabilities with significant positive 
impact on supply chain risk management. We point to the inadequacies of the classification 
system based on supply chain risk management processes and suggest it may contribute to 
lack of consensus in the field.  
We contribute to the debate over the importance of integration demonstrating its 
very strong effects to not only supply chain risk management but overall firm performance 
as well. Strong linkages between supply chain risk management and overall firm 
performance were also established. Supply chain risk management has a more significant 
effect on firm performance than supply chain performance establishing its strategic 
importance. 
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CHAPTER 3 SUPPLY CHAIN RESILIENCE: ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING FROM 
DISRUPTION 
 
Pam Manhart  
Dr. Jennifer Blackhurst and Dr. Frank Montabon 
3.1 Introduction 
The firms’ environment is becoming more turbulent faster than the firm is becoming 
more resilient (Hamel & Valikangas, 2003). Resilience is defined as the ability to recover 
after a supply chain disruption (Christopher & Peck, 2004) which is an interruption to the 
flow of goods or services (Craighead et al., 2007). The firm which can make sense of its 
environment develops more supply chain knowledge, which a recent meta-analysis has 
shown to be increasingly important to performance (Wowak et al., 2013). One way in 
which supply chain knowledge improves performance is through responses to disruption 
(Craighead, Hult, & Ketchen, 2009). Each disruption is an opportunity to learn and update 
supply chain knowledge by better understanding the environment and consequent supply 
chain risk (Fiksel et al., 2015). In order for the firm to learn from disruption, organizational 
learning mechanisms are required to capture, interpret and disseminate knowledge. In 
agreement with Huber (1991), we define organizational learning as an increase in the 
range of potential behaviors and not require their enactment. In fact, in the context of 
supply chain resilience, firms would hope to not encounter a disruption and enact learning. 
 Disruptions, however, are difficult to learn from. First, no two disruptive events are 
identical. They have different sources, severity and duration (Craighead et al., 2007). This 
makes patterns difficult to identify and learning more challenging. Second, social processes 
and dynamics inhibit organizational learning (Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999). Supply chain 
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personnel  managing a disruption are often simultaneously being affected by it (Hardy & 
Maguire, 2016). This can create a chaotic environment in which reflection and learning is 
secondary to recovery efforts. People will then choose to endure existing practices even 
when facing novelty (Carlile, 2004) resulting in oversimplified or misleading lessons 
(Desai, 2015).  
It is important to understand how firms learn and develop resilience because firms 
suffer financial, operational and relational losses from disruptions (Hendricks & Singhal, 
2005; Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009; Sodhi et al., 2012; Wagner & Bode, 2008). The number 
of firms suffering significant losses are increasing (Aon Risk Solutions, 2013). In addition to 
the external causes of more turbulent environments and increasingly complex supply chain 
networks, there are internal reasons for this trend. A recent study found that 75% of 
companies acknowledge they don’t fully understand their true losses from disruptions or 
the actual causes (Glendon & Bird, 2013). This makes identifying the appropriate resilience 
capabilities very difficult.  
Although understanding supply chain risk and management is critical to firm 
performance, little research has investigated the organizational response once a disruptive 
event has occurred (Greening & Rutherford, 2011). Answering the calls of  Desai (2015), 
Hardy and Maguire (2016) and (Van Der Vegt et al., 2015) we address the questions of how 
organizations respond to disruptions by learning greater resilience and why some learn 
more effectively than others. Due to the exploratory nature of our research questions, we 
complete case studies to empirically discover evidence. Evolutionary theory is utilized to 
frame our study which draws on and extends existing literature.  
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This research makes several contributions. We identify four distinct organizational 
learning mechanisms in the context of supply chain disruptions: fragmented, immediate, 
expert, and collective. Our study provides a framework for illustrating why some 
organizational learning mechanisms are more effective in learning from supply chain 
disruptions than others. We show that organizational learning is dependent upon the 
ability to update a firm specific risk dominant logic. We also reveal a new construct 
necessary to update the firm risk dominant logic, bracketing, defined as the practice of 
noticing environmental cues, interpreting underlying events, and assigning a 
differentiating category which produces an appropriate response. 
3.2 Organizational Learning And Supply Chain Resilience 
3.2.1 Organizational learning and evolutionary theory 
The basis of evolutionary theory (Nelson & Winter, 2009) is that environments 
change and organizations must change or respond accordingly to fit the new context. It 
follows a prescribed process of variation, selection and retention. In learning from supply 
chain disruption, the supply chain disruption serves as the variation. Firms must then 
select what information to attend to and act upon. Learning is retained through 
organizational learning mechanisms and routines.  
According to evolutionary theory, selection after variation is critical to determining 
the future form of the organization. For example, for individuals conducting postmortems 
after an event, Whiteman and Cooper (2011) find four patterns of sensemaking in their 
ethnographic study: ecological embedded uses site specific information, expert driven 
draws on skills from other sites, fragmented focuses on expectations and therefore misses 
cues, and disembedded, which focuses on social relations. Although these are individual 
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level patterns for making sense of material landscapes and ecological conditions, they 
conclude that experience relates to noticing subtle signs of vulnerability prior to the 
situation escalating into a crises. 
Postmortems in organizational learning, however, are different because individual 
and organizational learning are different (Weick, 1991). Although not all members of an 
organization are required to learn, by definition, organizational learning implies shared 
understandings among multiple actors. Among the multiple actors involved, several 
researchers have suggested that boundary spanners such as middle management (Beck & 
Plowman, 2009) and centrally located units or hubs (Nerkar & Paruchuri, 2005; Schilling & 
Fang, 2014; Tsai, 2001) share, transfer and retain more information. Shared understanding 
is hard to develop because people often form different interpretations of the same event 
(March, Sproull, & Tamuz, 1991). Groups with information do not share it when they don’t 
recognize its usefulness elsewhere (Huber, 1991). Likewise, groups won’t access or utilize 
the stored knowledge of others unless they recognize its value to them. Recognizing the 
value is more difficult when it is not applied to the exact same criterion (Kane, 2010).  
Huber (1991) lists several types of organizational learning which may occur after a 
disruptive event: experiential, in which feedback and appraisal follow; vicarious, in which 
second hand knowledge is gained through observing another organization’s event; grafting, 
in which external hires bring new knowledge to the firm; and searching, in which the 
environment is scanned or monitored in response to a problem. In their seminal study, 
Levinthal and March (1993) describe two organizational learning mechanisms, 
simplification and specialization and three learning myopias which limit improved 
organizational performance from those mechanisms. Organizations tend to focus on the 
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short term, events near to the learner and success rather than failures. Rather than 
continuously learning new capabilities, firms tend to repeat activities in which they possess 
competency. This can inhibit learning until an environmental trigger exposes a capability 
gap. In fact, Leonard‐Barton (1992) found that the longer a competency has been in place, 
the more difficult it is to change. 
Lampel, Shamsie, and Shapira (2009) summarize their special issue by identify four 
learning processes specifically triggered from rare events: learning about rare events 
concentrates on management of rare events; learning through rare events is self-learning 
of capabilities; deliberate learning pursues codification of best practices; and emergent 
learning generates unanticipated insights. They suggest that in contrast to views that rare 
events are interpreted systematically by probability estimates, they actually become salient 
due to their categorization and sensemaking (Beck & Plowman, 2009; Christianson, Farkas, 
Sutcliffe, & Weick, 2009). The danger of rare events or patterns based upon scarce history 
is superstitious learning may occur, which is making an incorrect attribution of causation. 
Beck and Plowman (2009) theorize that culmination and synthesis of interpretations 
across different levels of the organization results in more reliable learning.   
Consistent with evolutionary theory, random change is highly unlikely to result in 
positive outcomes (Nelson & Winter, 2009). Likewise, organizational learning doesn’t 
happen automatically or by chance, but requires deliberate organizational learning 
mechanisms (Madsen & Desai, 2010; Nembhard & Tucker, 2011; Pisano, Bohmer, & 
Edmondson, 2001; Srivastava & Gnyawali, 2011). Organizational learning mechanisms are 
critical to filtering what knowledge will be retained and disregarded (Hult, 2003). When 
they aggregate and synthesize varying perceptions, higher level learning occurs which 
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reassess norms, values and logic (Huber, 1991; Ocasio, Mauskapf, & Steele, 2016). Higher 
level learning involves understanding causation, long term effects and an opportunity to 
adjust beliefs.  It affects the entire organization as opposed to more common low level 
learning, which is more functional, conforming to beliefs and short term oriented (Fiol & 
Lyles, 1985).    
3.2.2 Supply chain resilience 
Bode et al. (2011) classify supply chain response to disruption into two broad 
categories: bridging and buffering. Bridging responses are due to supplier dependencies 
and focus on reducing uncertainty. They include information exchange, scanning and 
collaboration. Buffering responses, on the other hand, are independent of supplier 
dependencies. They protect the firm from a disruption by utilizing safety stocks, redundant 
suppliers and flexible production processes and product designs. The authors find that 
disruption impact, supplier dependence, and firm orientation inform the selection of 
response to supply chain disruption. 
Although firms conduct both bridging and buffering, supply chain disruptions 
continue. One reason is that many risk sources are difficult to predict even in stable 
networks, for example natural disasters. Predicted risks are often analyzed by traditional 
supply chain priorities such as annual spend and suppliers of key components which are 
not correlated with supply chain risk performance (Simchi-Levi et al., 2014). This leaves 
them vulnerable to risks stemming from non-key, low-cost, commodity suppliers 
Complicating matters, supply chain networks frequently change, if not immediate tiers, 
then subsequent tiers, i.e., a supplier’s supplier making risk identification more challenging. 
Network dependencies propagate disruptions (Craighead et al., 2007) which make it 
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difficult to unravel and identify the initial source. Therefore, our first premise is that while 
firms are mitigating supply chain risk from key sources, they remain vulnerable to many, 
evolving sources of risk.  
 Kaufmann, Carter, and Rauer (2016) investigated the transition from firm centric to 
network centric risk management strategies and found they co-evolve with the relationship 
dominant logic of the purchasing department. This was defined as the mindset for 
managing supplier relationships. After purchasing received negative feedback, firms then 
engaged in joint ventures and interfirm collaboration. This evolution of relationships helps 
us understand how supply chain risk management strategies evolve and how they can be a 
catalyst for other strategic initiatives. Our second premise is that the supply chain response 
to a supply chain disruption has the ability to trigger organizational learning impacting the 
evolution of supply chain risk management. 
Bode et al. (2011) suggest that what happens after a disruption has received scant 
attention in the literature. This is important because the disruption serves as the 
motivation to act. This source of variation is the first step in the evolutionary process. It is 
followed by a selection of whether the event warrants attention. Learning from disruptions 
are then retained through organizational learning mechanisms and routines.  
3.3 Method 
3.3.1 Data collection and coding 
 We design our descriptive case study in accordance with the positivist position of 
multiple case strategies to ensure maximum validity, reliability and theory development 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2014). This results in deeper understanding (Miles, Huberman, & 
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Saldana, 2013) and avoids the potential of biased results based on the conditions of a single 
case (Yin, 2011).  
Due to our interest in the organizational level of learning, our unit of analysis is the 
firm. Since supply chain risk stems from the wider supply chain network (Christopher & 
Peck, 2004), screening of cases began with firms representing a variety of industries. 
Industries differ by product life cycles (Chopra & Sodhi, 2004), density and complexity of 
networks, (Craighead et al., 2007) and network interdependencies (Bode & Wagner, 2015) 
which impact their supply chain resiliency.  
We utilized a replication strategy, by having multiple firms from each of four 
industry categories (Yin, 2014). We purposefully selected firms from a variety of industries 
including traditional manufacturing, services, healthcare and process based industries. 
Traditional manufacturing is the most common industry in supply chain research. Services 
and a focus on healthcare, are growing in their application of supply chain research. 
Process based industries were added for the unique variety they provided. Firms of 
interest within each industry were targeted based on their reputations as leaders within 
their industries and the potential for developing a contact.  
Contact individuals were identified and approached within targeted firms. Some 
contacts were found through personal networks and others were cold called. We enlisted 
participation by first asking the contact for the highest level person in their organization 
that would be responsible for supply chain risk management. That person became our key 
source who was then asked to participate and refer us to other senior leaders within the 
firm who participated in supply chain disruption recoveries similar to a snowball 
technique.  
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We confirmed a minimum of four subsequent participants per firm. This eliminates 
any individual bias in attempting to explore firm level phenomenon (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007). We eliminated one firm who could not meet the minimum requirement of 
senior leaders engaged with supply chain disruptions.  A second firm declined to 
participate and was replaced by another firm within the same industry. After the inclusion 
of nine total cases we reached theoretical saturation (Eisenhardt, 1989). This is within the 
recommended range for detail and manageability (Miles et al., 2013; Yin, 2014).  
Government agencies in this study represent different divisions of a large 
corporation where interagency cooperation and learning may occur during a disruption. 
We received support for this logic from a participant in Surgical Instruments who shared 
their observation: “Government agencies work more together now, sharing information.” 
Beginning with the Director of Public Health as our key source, other government agencies 
were identified as jointly participating in supply chain disruptions. See table 14 for a 
participant summary of all firms.  
This study was exempted from the requirements of the Institutional Review Board 
of human subject protection regulations. This document is found in appendix B. It is 
included to fulfill the body of manuscript formatting requirements of the Graduate College. 
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Table 14: Participant Summary 
 
The interview protocol was designed for consistency across a large number of 
interviews. Open ended, semi-structured interviews were conducted according to 
recommendations by Arksey and Knight (1999). They were conducted from March through 
November 2016. At least one onsite visit of one to two days was made to each firm by the 
first author. Interviews from cases within a day’s drive were all conducted face to face, 
although in some cases multiple visits were required. More distant cases were visited only 
once although in some cases for two days. Any participant unavailable during the onsite 
visit to more distant locations was interviewed over the phone including international 
participants. A total of 52 usable interviews were conducted. Each interview followed a 
prescribed protocol and lasted approximately one hour. They were audio recorded and 
professionally transcribed.  
Firm
# of 
Participants
Revenue
Employee 
Size
SIC 
Code
Industry 
Replication
Firm Age 
in Years
Title List
Participant 
Experience
Furniture 6 1-10b
10,000-
25,000
2522 Public Manufacturing 50-100
Dir of Flow Improvement, Director of Strategic Materials, 
Director of Supply Chain (2), Supply Chain Manager, VP 
of Operations
7-30 years
Biodiesel 4 1-10b 1-1,000 2911 Public Process 1-25
Director of Transportation, Manager of Rail Fleet, 
Transportation Manager, Senior Supply Chain Manager
3-29 years
Automotive 6 10-25b
100,000-
500,000
3714 Public Manufacturing 1-25
Production Control & Logistics Business Process 
Manager, Plant Manager, Plant PC&L, Program Director 
of Contract Manufacturing, Quality Manager, VP of 
Integrated Supply Chain 
12-33 
years
Consumer 
Durables
8 10-25b
50,000-
100,000
3633 Public Manufacturing 100-150
Dir Trade Customer Support, Dir Risk Management, 
Regional Distribution Mgr, Sr Finance Dir, Sr Mgr Global 
Information Systems, Sr Mgr of Order Fulfillment, Sr Mgr 
Reverse Logistics, Transportation Supply Chain Manager
8-32 years
Agribusiness 5 10-25b
10,000-
25,000
5143 Private Process 50-100
Dir of Transportation, Dir of Warehousing & Distribution, 
Sr Packaging Manager, Sr Warehouse Manager, Sr 
Transportation Manager
5-30 years
Retail 4 <50b
100,000-
500,000
5331 Public Sevice 50-100
Dir Risk & Security, Dir International Logisitcs, Dir Global 
Logistics Planning, Store Manager
13-34 
years
Surgical 
Instruments
8 1-10b
10,000-
25,000
3841 Private Healthcare 50-100
Dir Business Solutions, Dir Supply Chain APAC, Dir Supply 
Chain Europe, Dir Supply Chain Programs, Global Supply 
Chain Project Mgr, Mgr Sustained Supplier Engineering, 
North American Distribution Center Mgr, VP Supply 
Chain
10-36 
years
Pharmaceutical 7 10-25b
25,000-
50,000
2834 Public Healthcare 100-150
Dir Global Supply Chain, Dir Supply Chain Projects, Global 
Supply Chain Business Process Mgr, Global Supply Chain 
Risk Mgmt Consultant, Sr Dir Corporate Risk, Sr Dir 
Global Manufacturing & Procurement, Sr Dir Global 
Supply Chain
16-33 
years
Government 
Services
4 N/A
1,000-
10,000
9431 Public Service 100-150
Dir Department of Transportation, Dir Public Works, 
Executive Officer Public Health; State Veterinarian
10-22 
years
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Analysis began with interview notes of emergent concepts. Participants also 
provided supporting documents and files. Examples include risk analysis, reports, 
contingency plans and manuals. Additional information was obtained from the internet 
such as SIC codes, size and revenue. In sum data were triangulated with multiple 
informants per firm, on site visits and observations and corroborating materials (Jick, 
1979).    
 Transcription were loaded into NVivo and coding conducted according to 
recommendations by Miles et al. (2013). Initial coding was conducted line by line and 
provided descriptive summaries of participant views. Interview notes and the literature of 
emerging concepts were reviewed resulting in second level coding of patterns and 
categories. Some codes were divided or combined as coding progressed. Firm specific 
history, product, market and cultural information were provisionally coded by firm to 
enable the within case analysis. Features pertaining to organizational learning mechanisms 
such as timing and participation were coded separately to facilitate pattern recognition. 
Further review of the literature on patterns and categories as well as cross case analysis 
resulted in third level coding of themes. See table 19 in the appendix A: additional material 
for a coding summary. 
3.3.2 Within case analysis 
 Cases describe the products and market the industry is involved in and include any 
industry drivers of change. Firm culture is depicted by training practices, learning 
attitudes, acceptable risks and responses, and how disruption results are measured. 
Finally, the organizational mechanisms used are listed with an explanation of how they 
may have evolved over time. 
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Case 1: Furniture 
Our first case manufactures both stock and custom furniture. Production occurs 
across multiple sites worldwide and deliveries must be coordinated for the concurrent 
installation of entire suites of furniture. Market pressures have led to a greater variety of 
product offerings as well as lead time reductions. This squeezes the organization to do 
more with less.  
They haven’t had the resources for much organizational learning. “I don't know that 
we've ever given them the right education to … successfully put out a fire and then 
document and improve processes.” “We don't do any training around this kind of stuff. We 
just figure that you're going to figure it out, you know? “Materials are an afterthought. 
People don’t realize the impact of not having a good … and robust supply chain. It's more 
about push it out the door.” Their culture is highly influenced by cost control and a lean 
philosophy of continuous improvement.  
This informs their concept of acceptable risk. In reference to using inventory to 
buffer against variation they shared: “We're a just in time organization, we don't do that. 
That's scary. That's risky.” Product differentiation and an aptitude for change resulted in 
complexity for their suppliers who were selected by cheapest cost. “Transitions as a whole 
caused significant disruption in the organization and it felt like every time we did one it 
was the first time.” “Consistency across the facilities and departments isn't the best, which 
means we have best practices here and best practices there, and not so good practices here 
and there, and how do we bring that all together and make one consistent methodology 
that we follow and we know so that when there is an issue we can better solve it?” They 
have suffered many supplier related disruptions and address a lot of root causes – “and 
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that’s part of the problem. We’re too tolerant of change”. They acknowledged that “I think 
we helped them [suppliers] get there [fail us]”. “Product differentiation … resulted in 
supply chain disruptions, not always the supplier's fault”.  
The mechanisms Furniture uses to learn from disruption revolve around a team 
dedicated to monitoring and controlling risk, called the “control tower”. They now meet 
daily to jointly evaluate and escalate disruptive events. “Before it would be somebody 
emails somebody and waits for a response, and then emails another group and waits for a 
response.” “The trail is fresh for us to get at the root cause.” After action reviews are then 
conducted to report the consensus derived from the situation. “There is a root cause 
analysis done pretty thorough, and that's shared across all of the manufacturing plants and 
distribution centers, so that we can all learn.” However, a recent pilot towards greater risk 
reduction was explained, “We can't risk supply chain execution or disruption with a 
growing product line. We actually went with a higher part cost supplier who's more stable, 
who has better capabilities.” They are developing more standard work and consistent 
processes to reduce what they see as growing risk. “We had too many failures. And it was 
just, "guys, what can we do differently”?"  
Case 2: Biodiesel 
This case is a producer of biodiesel refined for custom markets. It is a relatively new 
and growing industry which is heavily regulated. They have had to build and acquire many 
refinement facilities in order to keep up with demand and expansion. Many of the markets 
have seasonal demand. Seasonality also impacts the appropriateness and availability of 
various inputs as well.  
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The young age of the company impacts the organization in many ways. They do not 
yet have many robust routines or training processes. “A new organization is not as focused 
on following procedures, [it] is more focused on determining where the variability is, 
learning how to adapt and perform, whatever the circumstances and the environment 
requires.” Lack of formality provides: empowerment “we like people to report or solve or  
take charge and that's the environment we're trying to inculcate”; flexibility “there's no 
solution that is not available to us. If we were a mature organization we would be locked 
into whatever the protocol required”, and responsiveness “we can do things in a matter of 
weeks”. Instead, they have an open floor plan they feel is key to information sharing and 
collaboration. “Being able to communicate small things constantly throughout the day. 
Sitting in a cluster… that's crucial.” The culture is influenced by the regulatory nature of the 
environment and many of the executives are lawyers. “The CEO likes attorneys working in 
non-attorney roles”. They rely on contractual mechanisms for control and capturing 
lessons learned. “We're putting legal terms in our contracts to avoid issues and things in 
the past, customers not calling, customers requesting different what nots, to where we're 
now taking to the contract basis, to where we try to close any loop holes that might still be 
out there.” “Hopefully [protection from risk] is all up front and it's already in contract.” The 
prevailing wisdom is cost control “more than any company I've worked for, which is 
interesting. Just really being cost-conscious”. This may stem from the age of the firm and a 
need to pay for initial investments like the refineries. They accept risk to serve financial 
purposes with the expectation they can execute their way out of any negative 
consequences. “[Employees] can run their … inventories low when they want to put more 
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pressure on the market, or they want to increase inventories because they can buy 
something cheap.”  
Reliance upon good execution, however, can’t eliminate costs when they are simply 
deferred. “We stored [rail cars] where it wouldn’t cost us any money. Now we have cars 
that are still in storage that aren't readily available to us. That costs us because it limits our 
capacity.” Individual discretion is key to organizational learning. “It's basically manager, 
team leader, and director-driven. How important is it to get to the root cause … taken in the 
totality of everything else that you're doing at the time.”  
The primary mechanism for organizational learning is an individual seeking 
expertise from more experienced personnel. “We need to get some help.” “You learn or 
share just by observing.” “A lot of it is just osmosis and learning and just listening to the 
other folks in the department.” “People in the discussion learn something because we're a 
close-knit team and verbal policies are usually arrived at.” Another mechanism is 
benchmarking similar industries. “We try to use the big oil platform … and ethanol.” Rapid 
industry growth has helped them recognize learning opportunities from disruptions. 
“We're doing a little bit better on some things where we've learned from the past.” “Now 
we have an integration team [for new refineries] to get others involved." This way, they can 
consistently apply lessons learned from past experience and update the knowledge of team 
experts with each new experience. 
Case 3: Agribusiness  
Agribusiness processes food and feed products many of which have low margins 
and very short shelf lives. They deal with a lot of seasonality in both supply and demand 
which are at opposing times of the year. They are heavily reliant upon trucking which ebbs 
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and flows between who has the greater power. Demand and distribution are very 
susceptible to weather conditions.  
Industry pressures afford little room for error, therefore, training is highly valued in 
the Agribusiness culture. “We're trying to have a centralized, standardized focus of training 
to put people on the same knowledge platform. We'll bring people from all the production 
facilities, and even overseas here to go through training.” 
Agribusiness is privately held and they feel that makes the culture less risk averse 
than a publicly held company. “I think there's a little more tolerance for risk [management] 
here. The quarter focus is king at a public company versus a private.” “We have a lot of 
latitude.” They monitor the environment closely for threats and opportunities. “We saw 
what [suppliers] went through with [competitor] and said, "let's go for it [proactive 
supplier fee schedule], what have we got to lose? If we screw it up we can reverse course, 
but we believe this is the right angle." And it turned out it was.”  Risk to them is the 
unknown “where we don't have a lot of institutional knowledge …the international space.” 
It depends on the maturity of the business unit, however. “Especially where the processes 
were mature, more refined, people are expected to follow them. They deviate from them far 
less. We’re less agile in terms of quickly understanding, "OK, this is what I've got to do." 
Agribusiness conducts grafting, bringing in outside talent to fill capability gaps. Risks are 
taken to prevent disruptions. “We tend to err on the side to avoid the disruption.” “We 
definitely can plan heavy … because the thing that we did not want, couldn't afford to have, 
was an outage.” “I probably drive my team nuts with the what-ifs. But, if we haven't thought 
that far ahead in terms of potential risk, then shame on us.” “We're very much tied to 
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getting the customer what they want. And getting them what they want on a consistent 
basis.”  
The focus on risk management capabilities has paid off for Agribusiness who has 
been able to use it as a competitive advantage. “The folks on our team did a great job, not 
just for our parts, but for our customers’ [other] parts. The reason it was really a success 
was not so much what we did for ourselves, but we became a value added for our 
customer.” They have highly structured mechanisms to ensure not only that learning gets 
captured but that members who were not involved can review the data and contribute to 
the conclusions drawn. “If somebody is not coordinating and driving it from an overall 
perspective you lose sight of those small things.” “In terms of how it's shared… it would be 
actively done through a function at corporate center.” “We basically put a case study up to 
the national group.” Here's the situation." How would you manage this? What are the 
challenges?" During the delay before the annual meeting, each person has time to reflect 
upon the situation. The larger audience will likely not come up with the same solution as 
the original group did initially. This simultaneously allows for input and learning 
generalization from a greater diversity of people as well as dissemination to the entire 
organization. Each unit’s solutions or lessons could be tailored to their specific context 
rather than just accepting or rejecting the initial generalization of those originally involved. 
The group originally involved might not possess enough knowledge of other business unit 
contexts to accurately generalize learning for them. The broader, collective involvement 
affords more accurate lessons and application of learning. “It kind of gives everyone a buy 
in.” “Once you get it embedded in the culture then you don't have to baby-sit it, it becomes 
natural. You become quicker to respond to changing conditions. You recognize risks and 
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gaps a lot quicker.” The reason Agribusiness have evolved this way is because “we've got 
our hands dirty and looked stupid.” “You're going to make mistakes, that's ok. But, you can't 
make the same ones.” 
Case 4: Consumer durables 
The combination of expensive consumer durables and a highly competitive market 
result in low margins. SKU proliferation has occurred in an attempt to provide greater 
competitive differentiation. This contributes to greater cost-compliance pressure. They 
have expanded globally to capitalize on cheap labor and growing markets. “What gives us a 
competitive advantage over many people is that we have a very large, very diverse global 
operating platform. With the commonality of platforms, it's not that difficult to be able to 
retool for a production run of the same product that's made in Poland to be made in Mexico 
or someplace else.” However, “with the purchase of [European acquisition]… and [Chinese 
acquisition] and a large presence in Russia and the Ukraine, think of the complexity that 
was just added. Now we're dealing with geopolitical risks…and there's not necessarily an 
eloquent or simple solution to that.” 
Knowledge is gained through experience and connections. “I'm going to be 
conditioned, due to that dramatic experience to do something and ask questions. But, I 
wouldn't have the network to be able to rely on, to ask that necessarily, if I were brand 
new.” Training is strategically conducted with the expectation that individual expertise will 
be redirected and shared as necessary. Due to strong pressure to maintain margins, a short 
term stockout is preferable to cutting deep into margins to ensure availability. Repeated 
risks are perceived to be known and accounted for but new, uncertain threats don’t have 
the historical data to warrant investment in prevention. “You've got to be pretty confident 
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that an event is going to happen where you're going to spend money ahead of time, kind of 
just in case. We don't do that here, unless it's a very painful event from in the past, or the 
probability of an outage is high.”  
Spending more than required is unacceptable. This results in reacting to disruptions 
which allows for higher reoccurrence. "I've seen that same problem for twenty years." 
"Well, why? What are we doing? Why aren't we solving that?” Higher reoccurrence has led 
to automatic responses of informal plans “the ones that we frequently kind of deal with… 
those just kind of come and we just kind of go through the motions.” 
Most of the organizational learning mechanisms are informal and cultural. “I've seen 
people who solve everything. You ask them what they did and they're like, "Oh, I don't 
know." Individuals share the tales of grand failures with newer employees to demonstrate 
what not to do. “There is definitely a kind of inside joke. You never want to be like 
[previous failure] was in 2010.”  However, permanent change is not usually achieved. “Next 
year, or five years from now, nobody will be doing anything, because the pain of that is 
gone. Leaders change and people move around, and, it just kind of becomes forgotten, until 
it happens again and everybody is like, "Oh, wow…" That recognition has led toward some 
more embedded mechanisms such as the enterprise risk management department. “That 
really taught us a lesson that it was not fully transparent. It took us way too long to be able 
to respond to that issue. So, we put together a lot of efforts to understand, not only our 
supply chain, but we geo-mapped that and superimposed our distribution and 
manufacturing sites so that we could take a look digitally at where things were happening.”  
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Case 5: Retail 
Retailer sells products from a wide variety of industries including cleaning products, 
electronics, groceries, clothing, office supplies, pharmaceuticals, and toys. Therefore, they 
purchase from quite a few very large and powerful suppliers. Customers expect that 
Retailer will offer top brands which equalizes the buyer supplier power of Retailer and 
their suppliers. This cultivates a win-win culture in which long term relationships are 
highly valued. “It's a lot harder to be successful if you're not trying to make everybody 
successful.” “It’s not just being good at their jobs, it’s their connections within the industry, 
because then you get the advanced notice.” Limited time offers and varying shelf lives of 
products add criticality and complexity to processes and availability. 
Certified trainers conduct employee training and job rotation is highly encouraged 
to gain experience in different areas. “Retail is a generalist culture. They don't want 
specialists.” Generalists solve problems by working together. “It's just a matter of finding 
the right people, finding the right information, getting that in the hands of the right people.” 
Priorities are established from the top. “Our CEO says, "Here's a category of items I 
guarantee we will not be out of stock on". This drives alignment in managing supply chain 
risk. “It's irresponsible not to have some sort of back-up plan, or a back-up plan to that 
back-up plan.”  
They invest proactively in relationships that can be leveraged later. “The only way 
we were able to get through that was leveraging our relationships with either the 
steamship lines or the terminals and to have us already have invested in those 
relationships prior to that event happening. We were able to pull levers that other retailers 
were not. And, that's what it came down to.” External relationships are also considered a 
65 
 
major source of risk identification.” “We scan the environment for risk. A lot of that 
intelligence is gathered through relationships that you have with individuals.” 
Mechanisms used for organizational learning from supply chain disruption are 
pushed independently by individuals who have the autonomy to meet expectations in 
multiple ways. The right internal relationships enable special accommodations. “How do 
you really know what your lost sales are, unless you actually have enough and you don't 
run out? Now I've got some partnerships at headquarters, so it's not a big deal. But, that 
first battle was hard because I was going against what everybody else did, but not 
everybody else is space-constrained and busy that time of year. The following year, our 
forecasts were way better because it was based on better numbers.” Retailer is starting to 
capture lessons learned through creation of expert roles who can then share with others. 
“It worked so well that we actually took that and made it into a chain line program for all of 
the [similar demand pattern] stores.” Metrics include disruption duration, inventory speed, 
reliability and network uptime. 
Retail has experienced pressure from online competitors and advancements in 
technology. Their desire to be customer focused has caused them to strive for greater 
supply chain resiliency. As managers override routines to be successful, the organization 
has evaluated and updated processes. They simulate disruptions, make contingency plans 
and have strategically developed more specialized roles, sometimes grafting expertise 
externally. “We brought in a chief risk and compliance officer. So when you have somebody 
that reports directly to your CEO focused on risk that forces you to ask those tougher 
questions and make sure you have the resiliency and controls in place to manage those 
risks.” 
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Case 6: Automotive 
This tier one automotive supplier produces parts for six different OEMs. The market 
is noted by high volumes and rigid schedules. Each OEM, additionally, has unique 
requirements, processes and demand. For example, some provide six weeks of electronic 
data information while others provide 40. Consistent across the organization, however, is 
the expectation that they must never be disrupted and steep penalties ensure total 
compliance. “Delaying the program for as little as a day can cost millions.” This causes 
Automotive to take drastic steps to satisfy their customers. “I've called up my logistics 
group and said 'I need a plane,' and they said you can have one as soon as one lands. You've 
got the rest of them up in the air." I said, "You mean I've got them all." He said, "Yep, you've 
got every plane I could get that's flying between here and Mexico to get you parts". 
Network exposure to risk is very high due to the high number of parts in an automobile. A 
supplier can suddenly lose demand because another supplier shut down the OEM. 
Employees change jobs between departments as well as international locations and 
learn primarily by practice. Production planning processes are highly valued and mature. 
“The key thing is the production planning process, the follow up checks and balances that 
we have in place to ensure that we have alarm systems throughout the process that signals 
that we're going to be short a part from a supplier, and then we can work it in advance.” 
Supplier issues are viewed as the cause of disruptions. “If something happens at one of our 
suppliers we don't have control over that except determining how much inventory we want 
to maintain. There's no way you can afford to house that much inventory.” “We have 210 
suppliers that supply this site. And the majority of them ship from Asia Pacific. The 
majority of our larger components are brought in on ocean freight and the smaller ones air. 
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So then you're at risk of multiple delivery issues.” Disruption response has developed into a 
core capability. “There's a recovery procedure for everything.”  
Recovery costs are not considered risky because they are passed on to the 
delinquent supplier. “The amount of money is not the issue, its complete customer 
satisfaction.” “We're chartering planes. We're stopping a truck because it can't get there 
fast enough and having the helicopter pick it up.” The accepted risk is the probability that 
the supplier won’t reimburse Automotive for all recovery efforts. Likewise, since issues are 
not considered internal, there is not a lot of learning from disruptions about prevention. 
“We didn't change anything due to [disruption] because I really think our process is robust. 
And you can't predict [disruption].” Response related knowledge however, is documented 
and updated during or immediately following a disruption. They are so good at recovery 
that responsiveness has become a competency trap (Levitt & March, 1988). Leadership just 
assumes that supply chain can alleviate any disruption. "This is just something that 
happens, make it go away. You guys do this all the time." “They think because you get so 
good at firefighting sometimes it becomes not such a good thing.” The measure of success is 
customer impact. “If you're aware of it and can react first, as long as you're not the slowest 
person, you don't get eaten by the lion. 
Learning is primarily local with input from experts. Mechanisms include templates 
for what to do, SharePoint sites for dispersing information, process maps to define 
procedures, and a known issues database. A central role coordinates activities during a 
disruption affecting multiple plants. Their focus is allocating the constrained material 
across multiple sites. “The recovery actions, the lessons learned, all of that, any potential 
continuous improvement, it lives in the site that had the problem.” “The roof collapsed, and 
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that business unit happens to comprise probably 70 percent of our global footprint for 
manufacturing. I can guarantee you that the people from the other divisions had no idea 
that it even occurred, let alone any sort of learning from it.” 
Case 7: Government services 
Some of the services included in government services include pharmaceutical 
inventory and allocation, quarantine and depopulation of infected food supplies, 
maintenance and availability of incident free transportation systems, and flood control. 
Interrelated government agencies coordinate during disruptions because of their 
interdependencies. Disease can move from human to animal and vice versa. Floods can 
disrupt local and interstate logistics, employee work routes, and also spread pathogens and 
impact illness. Their focus is on new threats. “Our big things right now… we're always on 
the outlook for a novel virus, 'novel' meaning the first time that it's been seen because the 
chances of you having immunity to it are going to be very, very slim.” “We rapidly hit them 
with something that might not totally eradicate [it] but may slow it down, help contain it 
long enough for us to identify what it is and then combat it with the most appropriate 
item.” 
Plans must be well defined and communicable because help during a crises is 
external to the agency. They don’t have the luxury of proactively training employees in 
every situation. “In order to operate … during a time of crisis [requires] anywhere from 80-
100 public health workers. I've got 17 people. It doesn't work.” For example, “we had 
veterinary students from [local university] helping on the surveillance testing, going farm 
to farm, wherever there were birds to collect samples for testing.” Disruption effects can 
quickly propagate. “Even though there were no positives in that county, the whole state can 
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be impacted. There's some foreign countries that will say, "If you have one case in the US 
we're not going to take anything from any state." “The potential for life or death impact 
drives risk management decisions. “We take that maximum response until proven 
otherwise.” “Having a response plan set up is an acceptable risk, it's expending resources 
and training time and staff time for something that we -- I hope we never need.  That would 
be the best case scenario, that I wasted money on being prepared for a tornado.” Some 
metrics track the speed of recovery. “Important is getting freedom from disease and getting 
back to business. Clearly to maintain continuity of business during that type of disease 
event is extremely important.” Like manufacturing, they acknowledge the more accurate 
metric would be to capture the disruption averted. "How do you measure the effectiveness 
of emergency medical services? The only way you could do that is you'd have to shut them 
all off for a two week time period. I'm not sure that in the business of human life that we 
want to take that gamble and that risk.” 
During disruptions, interrelated agencies convene in a ‘war room’ to facilitate 
information sharing and communication. Due to the gravity of scenarios as well as 
restrictive budgets, government services places great importance in coordination to gain 
public feedback, capture lessons learned, share best practices and document potential 
process guidelines. In addition to reviewing disruptions with those agencies they 
coordinated with during the disruption, they also network with counterparts in other 
states. They go to association conventions, schedule regular conference calls. “I'm very 
happy to learn from the lessons of others.” Scenario role playing helps agencies prepare as 
well as educates decision makers. “We took, to national disaster response training, a crew 
of 70 that included elected officials, city managers, county administrators, highway people, 
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fire chiefs, sheriff, and deputies, and medical leaders, and even business members and 
community leaders to run through a scenario that was, "Imagine the Joplin tornado 
dropped in your footprint." It was a command post computer simulation exercise.” The 
robustness is relatively new. “Our approach to things is vastly different today than it was… 
most of our stuff came about because of September 11th, 2001. Public health had not been 
part of the primary response group of the traditional fire, police and EMS. The federal 
government has put a lot of money into the effort of ensuring that public health as well as 
hospitals, that the entire healthcare system is able to respond in a unified process.” 
Case 8: Surgical and medical instruments 
Patient lives are at stake if the required surgical and medical instruments aren’t 
available when needed. Products requested by even a single doctor are stocked. Quality 
products drive reputations and sales. Decades of growth and an entrepreneurial spirit led 
to autonomous agents empowered to do whatever it takes to keep up, including products, 
processes and technology systems. Patient driven healthcare and increased government 
oversight have created a reverse swing in strategy towards caution and cost control. The 
company’s historical value of quality overlaps with this new pressure resulting in efforts to 
standardize. “There's what I call an awakening that efficiency, effectiveness and waste 
reduction does not equal bad healthcare.”   
Most training is not formalized. Efforts are made to cross train within departments. 
Significant resources have been re-allocated towards regulatory compliance, constraining 
activities to improve costs “from want to need.” The common practice of reacting to a 
disruption through substitution of alternate components or suppliers, is not an option 
because regulatory approval for such changes takes years. Therefore, the predominant 
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strategy has been to carry significant inventories in preparation for a supply chain 
disruption. “A disruption would have to be really massive to create a big problem for us.” 
They understand how this holds them back from being responsive and cost effective but 
find change requires a “transformation”. In fact, to find the mindset and skills necessary for 
the new direction they often hire externally from other industries.  
Supply chain now finds “a seat at the table”. Supplier evaluations were based on 
annual spend but now look at the impact on the overall business. Network relationships are 
seen as a valuable source of risk identification. “They want to jump through hoops for you. 
We were able to continue running [although] it took almost a year and a half for them to 
come back up.” Metrics gauge the impact to manufacturing, distribution and the patient. 
“There’s not really an accountability factor in reaction, you take it as it comes and get 
rewarded for solving problems rapidly.” 
Efforts are underway to transfer “tribal knowledge”, to the broader organization. 
Although historically voluntary, some documentation of local best practices and 
relationship histories is underway. Specialist roles have emerged which attempt to capture 
and share knowledge more broadly. The challenge is to develop the appropriate strategy 
and align it across the organization because “if everyone is autonomous you can be super 
busy but not move in any particular direction.”  
Case 9: Pharmaceuticals 
Each drug is unique and Pharmaceuticals is the sole source until the patent expires. 
The focus is on patented drugs because they impact patient lives. Patients have alternatives 
for disruptions in generic drugs. If a patient had to switch drugs due to a disruption they 
are not likely to switch back again after recovery. Supply chains get heavily involved during 
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the trial phase to help speed time to market. There are first mover advantages for drugs 
with similar efficacy. 
Annual risk reviews are conducted on each product line to three tiers. Employees 
across units in similar roles meet in monthly forums to share best practices. Training has 
become highly valued because of a painful experience not capturing organizational 
knowledge. They received an FDA warning a second time because the employees were 
inexperienced. Those employees involved the first time were no longer in their roles. Job 
rotation was occurring too fast. “We want deep expertise… to develop knowledge and 
wisdom such that when you see an incident and then you see something else five years 
from now, it's not you're learning it for the first time… I know exactly what to do to 
respond to that.” Succession plans are in place for management and key contributor roles. 
Government regulation has a strong influence on priorities. “We make life-saving 
medicines… we guarantee the government that we will maintain at least a year's stockpile 
of active ingredient.” Regulatory documents bind them to specific suppliers. They strive to 
select suppliers who have multiple locations to reduce site related risks. They don’t 
manufacture anything in India or China to reduce the risk of counterfeits.  
Market and regulatory driven priorities, however, provide alignment. “There's a 
couple of reasons now to implement something that's going to help out with risk.” For 
example, two dimensional bar codes required to enable conducting a recall, also provide 
supply chain visibility. Customer service and inventory levels are used to measure success. 
“Despite the fact that consultants consistently come in and say, "You have too much 
inventory," we've chosen to say no.” Although they have experienced catastrophic 
disruptions, they’ve not impacted the patient in over ten years.  
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Pharmaceutical has extensive mechanisms to learn from disruption. Mitigation 
plans and checklists are updated on collaboration websites. After action reviews and root 
cause are conducted. Key employees in each department are certified as “go to” specialists. 
A couple times a year they conduct simulations of scenarios which would trigger a 
disruption. These enable cross functional teams to engage in learning without the pain of 
experiencing a disruption. They test new processes instituted after the most recent 
disruption or newly identified sources of disruption. The risk management process owner 
gets ideas by vicariously researching cases of others’ disruptions. These are used not only 
to identify vulnerabilities but also justify new initiatives. However, sometimes requests for 
new initiatives are denied until the vulnerability creates a problem. 
Within case results are summarized in table 15. 
Table 15: Firm Summary 
 Market Impact Training 
Attitudes 
Risk Attitudes Metric Driver of 
Evolution to 
Greater 
Embeddedness   
Highest Level 
Mechanism 
Commonly 
Used 
F
u
rn
it
u
re
 Product 
proliferation 
and cost 
reduction 
No best 
practices, 
figure it out on 
your own  
Not being ‘lean’ 
is unacceptable, 
constant change 
is tolerated 
Customer 
impact 
Firm generated 
turbulence 
makes them 
more 
vulnerable 
Expert: 
“control 
tower” 
B
io
d
ie
se
l New, high 
growth product 
Standard 
protocols are 
restrictive 
Contractual 
protection from 
anticipated risk  
Profit Minimal 
priority, trying 
to keep up with 
growth  
Voluntary: 
employee 
discretion 
A
gr
ib
u
si
n
es
s 
Low margins 
and high 
seasonality  
Highly 
structured, no 
room for error 
Long term view, 
reduce 
uncertainty, 
avoid outages 
Customer 
value 
Past problems, 
don’t repeat 
mistakes  
Collective: 
case studies 
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Table 15 continued 
C
o
n
su
m
er
 D
u
ra
b
le
s Highly 
competitive, 
high cost, low 
margins 
Experience 
and 
connections 
Short term 
stockouts are 
tolerated over 
financial losses, 
proactive for 
only known risk 
Customer 
promise 
date 
Painful past, 
avoid being the 
latest example 
Immediate: 
after action 
reviews 
R
et
ai
l 
Online 
competition 
and technology 
requirements  
Dedicated 
functional 
trainers and 
job rotation 
Leverage 
relationships for 
detection and 
service 
Service 
level 
Competitive 
pressure for 
greater 
resiliency 
Voluntary: 
connections 
A
u
to
m
o
ti
v
e
 High volume, 
rigid schedules 
Experience 
and job 
rotation 
Recovery 
competencies, 
pass costs to 
disruptive 
supplier 
Customer 
impact 
Lack of 
evolution is 
considered 
evidence of 
competence 
Immediate: 
templates of 
recovery 
procedures 
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t 
Se
rv
ic
es
 Distinct 
agencies with 
high levels of 
coordination, 
life and death 
consequences 
Personal 
networks 
Triage priorities, 
disruptions are 
uncontrollable 
and unavoidable, 
‘wasted’ 
preparation is 
valuable 
Service 
level 
Painful past, 
exposed 
capability gaps 
and the need 
for volunteer 
resources 
Collective: 
simulations 
Su
rg
ic
al
 I
n
st
ru
m
en
ts
 Industry shift 
from doctor 
driven 
healthcare to 
patient driven 
healthcare and 
increased 
regulatory 
enforcement 
Experience of 
highly tenured 
employees, 
personal 
networks 
Regulation is 
considered 
restrictive to 
adaptation, 
inventory buffers 
are considered 
the only option 
Customer 
impact 
Poor 
performance 
due to lack of 
transformation, 
handmade 
quality must be 
more cost 
efficient 
Voluntary: 
connections 
P
h
ar
m
ac
eu
ti
ca
ls
 Although drugs 
are unique, 
competition 
offers drugs 
with similar 
efficacy 
Functional and 
cross 
functional 
training 
Vulnerability to 
counterfeits is 
unacceptable, 
inventory buffers 
are heavily used 
Service 
level 
Patent 
expiration 
requires 
service levels to 
maintain sales 
Collective: 
simulations 
 
3.3.3 Cross case analysis 
Synthesizing the individual cases reveals varying performance in organizational 
learning from supply chain disruption. Patterns exist among the firms regarding shared 
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and unique phenomenon. We present tabular evidence and theoretical explanations for 
observed patterns of results. 
Risk dominant logic 
Each firm possessed a risk dominant logic. This pervasive logic dominated 
perceptions and actions leading toward convergence of the mitigation of risk established 
by these norms (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). Contrary to realist 
perspectives of risk as measurable and assessable, our findings indicate that firms make 
supply chain risk decisions according to their dominant logic of risk, beliefs about 
acceptable and unacceptable sources and consequences we call normed risk. Each firm 
possessed strong capabilities in practices mitigating normed risk but struggled to gain 
commitment or apply resources towards risk outside of the dominant logic we refer to as 
non-normed risk. It is an overemphasis on the reliability of shared knowledge. Such strong 
capabilities can influence the perception of outcomes a priori based upon expectations, not 
actual observations (Levinthal & March, 1993).  
People act according to what they know and unknowingly have blind spots. 
Employees don’t ignore non-normed risk in a self-serving sense, nor is it an attempt by 
leadership to control divergent views. Either they don’t see it or it is considered irrelevant. 
By nature, there is inherently plenty of normed risk to work on – and people are good at it. 
Anticipations based upon normed risk are often confirmed which then reinforces itself.  
The risk dominant logic can be driven top down by management. “There's a 
mentality that has changed in the company, and [leadership is] heading that up. It's pretty 
much burned in everybody's memories, minds. It helps people make decisions about what's 
important and what's not” (Medical Devices). “We don't do a great job at thinking about a 
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risk score, risk value, on each one of our plants and then determining how we protect it. 
You've got to think about it in terms of revenue.” (Automotive). “That's not something 
that's on the mind of one person, it's engrained into the work flows of the entire 
organization” (Government Services). “It's a dominant mindset” (Furniture). 
It can also grow bottom up based upon history. “It's impossible not to over rely your 
past experiences” (Biodiesel). “The only thing you can do is order heavy” (Agribusiness). 
The risk dominant logic locks behavior into past patterns of success and failure, preventing 
identification of new risks and solutions. “We tried that once and it ended in disaster” 
(Medical Devices). This is consistent with findings from Zsidisin and Ellram (2003) that 
firms unilaterally utilize buffers regardless of the actual level of supply risk. The 
superstitious learning is that alternatives can’t be successful. Superstitious learning is an 
incorrect conclusion of an event.  
Changing the risk dominant logic as conditions change is challenging and requires 
organizational learning mechanisms. “For it to be successful it has to be cultural, because 
you can't get people to change that thought process, you can't force it, it goes back to what 
is acceptable to you as a business” (Agribusiness). “You've got to fight through your own 
predetermined ideas and get down to the facts" (Biodiesel).  
Organizational learning mechanisms 
Across the nine cases we observed four distinct patterns of organizational learning 
mechanisms used after a supply chain disruptions: fragmented, immediate, expert and 
collective. Each is described below and compared in table 16.  
(1) Fragmented.  Fragmented organizational learning mechanisms are 
disembedded, voluntary and therefore, sporadic and inconsistent. Individuals may 
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voluntarily share knowledge surrounding an event. Teams may also have task specific 
group discussions with local input and sharing. Learning is highly contextual and confined 
within the bounds of the dominant logic. Dissemination of learning to others outside the 
group is informal and limited to personal networks. This mechanism is susceptible to all 
three learning myopias. It focuses on the immediate disruption event being impacted by 
the learner and is likely to produce learning which reinforces the risk dominant logic.   
(2) Immediate.  Immediate organizational learning mechanisms are embedded 
processes which occur immediately after the disruptive event. Formal review processes 
such as after action reviews and root cause analysis generally address what went right and 
wrong. Discussing what went wrong has the opportunity to overcome the myopia of failure. 
Learning is often limited to gaining consensus of the event by those who experienced it. 
Because of proximity to the event, participants don’t generally know the long term 
consequences of the mitigation efforts beyond resuming normal operational flow. 
Knowledge may be dispersed to a close group of stakeholders, however, generalizations are 
limited to the understanding of participants’ knowledge of other business groups.  
Individuals also update templates in documents, websites and systems which are 
publicly stored for others to access later. The endurance of these documents may overcome 
the myopia of time. Typically normed risk is addressed and the group impacted quickly 
transitions to catching up on their normal roles and responsibilities. Should learning 
contrary to the dominant logic happen to occur, the group may struggle to obtain the 
necessary resources to mitigate non-normed risk. 
(3) Expert.  Specialist employees or teams of experts are embedded within the 
structure of the organization. They are called upon to assist during disruptions and provide 
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expertise gained by their experience over diverse events. This diversity can help counter 
the myopia of nearness. Continuation of the role over time affords the opportunity to 
reflect, leading to greater knowledge and the opportunity to develop stronger supply chain 
resilience. This can also help solve the myopia of time. Their credibility and visibility 
usually command an abundance of resources to deploy during a disruption. Participants 
are provided strong support for their current situation but don’t necessarily gain vast 
knowledge apart from access to the expert. Contextual learning usually disseminates from 
the expert to employees engaged in the disruption. The experts have credibility and may 
have success in dealing with the myopia of failure and perhaps changing the dominant 
logic. However, the success which makes them credible may also limit the perceived need 
for change. Perceived competency in recovery due to the expert may in fact be part of the 
dominant logic thwarting the firm’s development of improved resilience capabilities. This 
mechanism is empirical support for the argument by Hardy and Maguire (2016) that 
retrospective reviews often emphasize expert knowledge while anecdotal evidence from 
lay people are ignored. 
(4) Collective.  Collective engagement from a broader audience results in the highest 
form of learning. Case studies were conducted at senior leadership meetings. Narratives of 
actual events were presented to a group representing all of the major business groups. It’s 
not a judgement of what occurred in the heat of the moment, but an opportunity to pause 
and reflect and look at the bigger picture in a less tense environment. Initially after a 
disruption, employees are dealing with the aftermath of the disruption. Work that was 
postponed during the event must now be addressed. Reflection and learning are not 
priorities.  
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First, without knowledge of the outcome, collective discussion ensues about various 
mitigation ideas. Then the actual responses are shared and further discussion takes place. 
Other groups can ask questions relevant to them. The input stimulates innovative thinking 
by each presenting group who now has the benefit of hindsight, but also allows other 
groups to provide input and determine what is generalizable to them.  
This is a critical distinction because when knowledge is disseminated across a 
boundary it can’t just be transferred, it must be transformed to another context to be 
understood (Bechky, 2003). This has the highest chance of updating the risk dominant logic 
and mitigating non-normed risk because of the simultaneous higher order learning by the 
broad audience of authority figures. “Once you've been through an exercise… it makes you 
more in-tune to think about, "what if this happens…" It starts getting you thinking that not 
everything is smooth sailing” “A good recovery is really just having thought about those 
things ahead of time” (Pharmaceuticals). 
 Another collective method is cross functional simulations. Scenarios are created 
and players react as mock events unfold. Capabilities are tested, and new sources of risk 
and process gaps are identified as events propagate.   
While the other mechanisms are based upon experiential learning, collective cases 
and simulations build knowledge on narratives which can identify non-normed risk (Garud, 
Dunbar, & Bartel, 2011). Identification of non-normed risk can help organizations break 
competency traps of the risk dominant logic and successfully transform to another life 
cycle phase or prosper after failing to meet goals.  
Firms can progress from voluntary to immediate and expert to collective 
mechanisms. Firms in the growth stage had less effective organizational learning 
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mechanisms. Managerial attention may be focused on growth or perhaps during growth, 
the environment is just too unstable to notice any particular variation. Some firms in the 
maturity phase were firmly entrenched in their risk dominant logic and efforts to change 
went unheeded. Others had identified variation but not yet selected a new strategy. Firms 
who recognized pressure from changing environments often enacted new strategies. 
Responses to supply chain disruption justified more effective mechanisms, which in turn 
helped firms identify variation and select new strategies. Table 16 summarizes the 
mechanisms for organizational learning from disruption. Table 17 depicts an 
organizational learning from disruption framework of breadth of learning and impact by 
supply chain resilience capability development. 
Table 16: Organizational Learning Mechanisms 
Mechanism Fragmented Immediate Expert Collective 
Who Individuals, co-
workers or 
departments 
Individuals, 
local teams 
Ad hoc experts 
and local 
members  
Cross 
functional 
teams and 
leadership 
Boundary Object Exploitative 
sharing of event 
specific 
knowledge 
Templates, 
repositories and 
after action 
review 
Structured 
role, team or 
department 
Case study, 
simulation 
When During an event Immediately 
following an 
event 
During an 
event 
Time lapsed 
Dissemination Fragmented Broad Narrow Broad 
Learning 
Outcomes 
Task specific Context specific Context 
specific 
High level  
Overcomes 
Myopia 
N/A Time, failure Time, nearness Time, 
nearness 
and failure 
Learning 
Approach 
Experiential  Experiential  Experiential  Narrative 
 
 
 
 
81 
 
Table 17: Model of Organizational Learning Through Disruption 
 Weak 
Capabilities 
Strong 
Capabilities 
Broad 
Learning 
Immediate Collective 
Narrow 
Learning 
Fragmented Expert 
Bracketing 
The analysis reveals differentiation in responses to disruption. Supply chain risk is a 
social construction which privileges the risk dominant logic unless special attention is paid 
to non-normed risk. How a situation is initially approached influences the interpretation 
and response. Combining these insights with the literature revealed a distinguishing factor, 
bracketing, summarized in table 18. The term bracketing has been used to describe coding 
in qualitative analysis and sensemaking in individual learning. Bracketing in this context is 
how we interpret and classify risk knowledge. Bracketing expands the interpretation of 
events so that organizational learning can occur. We define bracketing of supply chain risk 
knowledge as the practice of noticing environmental cues, interpreting underlying events 
and assigning a differentiating category that produces an appropriate response. When less 
uncertainty is perceived, less data is collected and analyzed. How risk knowledge is 
bracketed impacts the subsequent learning and supply chain resilience strategies 
developed.  
Bridging collects data, but bracketing determines the attention it gets. Without 
bracketing, precursors such as weak cues and unusual events may be overlooked because 
they are not part of the risk dominant logic. Overlooked signals can propagate into bigger 
disruptions. Once a disruption has become complex it can be difficult to unravel the 
underlying causes. The symptoms may be more familiar and support continuation of the 
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risk dominant logic. This is similar to Wildavsky’s (1988) theory of searching for safety 
which asserts that buffering based upon expected surprises creates a false sense of 
security. Resilience must be searched for through methods of probing the unexpected. 
While bridging and buffering seek to reduce stress, bracketing is stress seeking.  
It requires a mindset that doesn’t accept a situation at face value or as inexplicable. 
It is an ability to recognize patterns to see a hazard early before it propagates and becomes 
so complex it is hard to get at the root cause. "This is different, why am I seeing all of these 
patients here?" (Government Services). Pattern recognition comes from experience which 
is why firms utilizing collective mechanisms have come to avoid frequent job rotation. “The 
more experience… education you get, you'll learn to identify the precursors to emergencies. 
You're not quite sure what might go wrong, but you do know that this is something you've 
got to pay attention to before it does go wrong” (Biodiesel). Understanding can help 
pinpoint mitigation rather than relying on more broad sweeping and costly methods. 
Bracketing activities, such as the narrative in collective organizational learning 
mechanisms, facilitate the aggregation of multiple, diverse narrative accounts that have the 
potential to alter perceptions (Hardy & Maguire, 2016). Patterns can be recognized from 
seemingly isolated cues in different parts of the organization. By hearing diverse narratives 
and asking questions, they overcome filtering by the risk dominant logic and bring non-
normed risk to light. Only when new risks become part of the dialogue can they result in 
new resilience capabilities. When current risks are better understood, outdated risks can 
become less prominent. This is known as higher level or double loop learning (Fiol & Lyles, 
1985). It is feedback, not foresight, which drives evolution (Jacobides & Winter, 2012). This 
also distinguishes bracketing from bridging and buffering which requires some foresight. 
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Thus, in addition to bridging and buffering responses to disruption, we propose bracketing 
as a necessary response to supply chain disruption.  
 Rerup (2009) describes three types of attention: stability, vividness and coherence. . 
He suggests all three dimensions are necessary to identify weak cues and unusual events, 
however, it requires discipline and coordination. Stable attention comes through routines. 
Attentional vividness focuses on many concurrent events and results in pattern matching. 
Attentional coherence is the dispersion across groups of attention focused on specific 
events. Bracketing can help magnify and draw attention to weak cues and unusual events 
to prevent a supply or market disruption from impacting the firm. Collective organizational 
learning mechanisms provide this triangulation of attention by crossing group boundaries 
(coherence); digging deeper into events beyond symptoms to uncover causes (vividness); 
and updating routines and the risk dominant logic (stability). Bracketing helps to balance 
the reliability of shared knowledge and the validity of exploring novel ideas (March et al., 
1991). In this way, bracketing activities highlight areas of needed attention which can 
evolve firm supply chain resilience capabilities.  
Table 18: Bracketing Theoretical Framework 
Definition The practice of noticing environmental cues, interpreting underlying 
events and assigning a differentiating category that produces an 
appropriate response. 
Theoretical 
Foundation 
Resilience must be searched for. Avoidance of risk hinders development of 
resilience capabilities. Learning resilience is strength from stress which is 
distinct from stress reducing methods such as redundancy/buffering 
(Wildavsky, 1988). 
Origins Sensemaking: an incipient state of sensemaking guided by mental models 
(Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). 
Qualitative analysis: looking beyond preconceptions to more 
clearly and accurately construct participants’ perspectives and phenomena 
(Tufford & Newman, 2012). 
When In response to supply chain risk, disruption or precursor. 
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Table 18 continued 
Who Individual contributors, management and teams within the firm or supply 
chain network. 
Examples  Furniture: “Sometimes it just feels like there's more… something 
systematic going on that we need to go after and fix.” “We've always 
pulled the levers through production, never the material side of it, 
being, "How do I have strategic inventory in place to make myself 
successful? And so now I think we've finally opened our eyes to that.”  
 Agribusiness: “Things weren't going well. We stepped back and 
realized, "You know what? We own pretty much all of this 
[responsibility]”.”  
 Automotive: “There is some level of cookie-cutterness to [disruptions], 
but each one of them are still very unique and there's generally some 
spin off that we didn't think about.” 
 Pharmaceutical: “We found out after the fact that their tooling is bad. 
They wanted us to buy new tools. Well, nobody ever talked about 
what's the issue? It was just "I need material.” "Well, we can only get 
you so much this week." Nobody ever asked, "Why are you only getting 
so much this week?" And then when we finally did ask that question, 
we were so far in the hole…” 
 Surgical instruments: “Those winds of change are changing. As that 
moves, I think we'll have disruptors come into the industry and 
actually… if we don't do it fast enough, they'll disrupt us and show us.” 
“We're seeing that we each have individual data that needs to be shared 
and trying to get places to share that.” 
 
 
3.4 Discussion 
3.4.1 Theoretical contributions 
First, this study contributes to the evolutionary theory of firm change. We describe 
how firms evolve their supply chain resilience capabilities by experiencing variation 
through a supply chain disruption, selection of what events to attend to and retain 
organizational learning through routines such as organizational learning mechanisms. This 
study also ties organizational learning from disruption to the literature on rare and unusual 
events, as well as learning from failure and safety.  
This study also extends the dominant logic perspective to supply chain risk and 
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introduces the constructs of risk dominant logic and bracketing. A risk dominant logic 
pervades each firm which shapes the perception of risk sources and available management 
strategies. Each firm recognizes and mitigates normed risk for their firm, however, 
disruptions continue. Bracketing is required to deviate from the firm dominant logic, 
address non-normed risk, and update supply chain resilience capabilities.  
We extend organizational learning and sensemaking to the supply chain resilience 
literature by looking at how disruptive events are interpreted and classified. This adds a 
distinctive factor to the previously identified bridging and bracketing responses to supply 
chain disruption. Bracketing helps explain why some firms have superior supply chain 
resilience capabilities.  
We identified four organizational learning mechanisms used to learn from supply 
chain disruption. Mechanisms are classified into four categories of fragmented, immediate, 
expert and collective with varying degrees of dissemination and supply chain resilience 
capability development. Fragmented organizational learning has very little selection and 
retention compared to variation. Learning is limited to task and context specific knowledge 
and not widely shared. Immediate organizational learning has higher retention, however, 
knowledge selection can be limited to the risk dominant logic of the firm. Experts select 
responses from vast experience to new disruptions but knowledge is less broadly shared. 
Collective learning has both broad dissemination and also results in strong resilience 
capability development. It has high selection due to the temporal distance from the event 
and high retention due to the expanded number of participants.  
 
 
86 
 
3.4.2 Managerial implications  
This study provides insight for supply chain risk strategy. Much of supply chain risk 
and resilience has focused on identifying sources, network characteristics, position in the 
network and supply base strategies. We find, however, that internal practices such as 
bracketing and collective organizational learning mechanisms may be as important as 
those practices managing external factors. Although we agree that every supply chain 
disruption cannot be avoided, we argue that supply chain resilience can be accelerated. 
Introduction of stress seeking bracketing can accelerate the acknowledgement of non-
normed risk and updated supply chain resilience. 
Firms with generalist roles who encourage job rotation may want to discontinue 
that practice and promote more prolonged job experience in order to facilitate pattern 
recognition of non-normed risk. However, caution must be exercised in creating roving 
expert roles because over-reliance upon experts can create core competence rigidities. This 
is important because if firms can adapt to environmental changes sooner than their 
competition they can gain a competitive advantage. 
3.5 Limitations 
The primary limitation of any case study is generalizability due to the small number 
of cases. Although we include a variety of industries, caution must be exercised in 
extrapolating the results. Certainly this is not an exhaustive list of practices used for 
organizational learning from disruption but after experiencing diminishing returns we feel 
confident that the categories in our framework for organizational learning are theoretically 
saturated. 
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3.6 Future Research 
Future work could develop a survey instrument for the organizational learning from 
disruption mechanisms, risk dominant logic and bracketing. This could identify the 
contribution of mechanisms to various outcomes such as supply chain and firm 
performance. Likewise, the operationalization of risk dominant logic and bracketing within 
the context of supply chain risk would be informative as to its significance in determining 
performance differences.  
Another useful measure would be a practitioner metric for more comprehensively 
assessing supply chain resilience i.e. time without incident. A comprehensive metric would 
help firms know when to address risk and more accurately track performance outcomes. In 
addition to obvious practitioner benefits, standardization by industry would provide 
eventual data sources for supply chain risk researchers. For example, extending bracketing 
to data analytics could help in understanding a lack of clarity from data. 
Results could be viewed from other unit of analysis. Organizational behavior studies 
of individual differences and personality could explore supply chain employees to 
determine the antecedents and enablers of the ability to detect patterns and identify 
precursors to disruption. Can they be preselected or trained? For example, are intrinsically 
motivated people more likely to be adept at bracketing? Additionally, how can supply chain 
teams successfully negotiate outside the established norm of the firms risk dominant logic? 
How many team members or participants need to have bracketing skills?  
From a network perspective, the importance of narratives from collective 
mechanisms could indicate that supply chain integration capabilities complement 
88 
 
bracketing. It would be interesting to test the relationships between firms with capabilities 
in both integration and bracketing.  
3.7 Summary 
 Firms develop a risk dominant logic to develop and facilitate appropriate responses 
to supply chain risk. Over time, firms become competent at supply chain resilience 
capabilities consistent with normed risk of the risk dominant logic. As environments and 
institutions change, however, those competencies can become a trap blinding the supply 
chain to needed changes. Bracketing and collective organizational learning mechanisms can 
help firms break competency traps to identify and address non-normed risk. We identify a 
taxonomy of four organizational learning mechanisms for development of stronger supply 
chain resilience capabilities: fragmented, immediate, expert and collective. A model of 
retention frames mechanisms by knowledge retention and resilience strength.  
We introduce the concept of bracketing to the framework of bridging and buffering. 
Nonstandard disruptions require reflection and deeper analysis than standard cases so that 
connections may be found between seemingly heterogeneous events. (Haunschild & 
Sullivan, 2002; Stan & Vermeulen, 2013). These distinctive patterns can help explain how a 
disruption may unfold (Lampel et al., 2009). Bracketing can identify distinctive patterns of 
risk to enable appropriate bridging and buffering resilience capabilities. 
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Table 19: Coding Detail 
3rd 
Level 
2nd 
Level 
1st Level Example 
O
L
 M
ec
h
an
is
m
s 
F
re
sh
 
Fragmented "We didn't take what we learned and pass it on to 
another set of the organization." Furniture 
Immediate "An after action review pretty simply put it's, "What did 
we do well?" "What did we expect to happen?" and 
"How well did we deal with it?" Agribusiness 
D
el
ay
ed
 
Expert "From the different learnings that they've been getting 
from different plants, they come here to tell us what is 
it that we need to be doing different. And we provide 
feedback and then he takes that to the other plants." 
Automotive  
Collective "We go out in the district and do an exercise where we 
get everybody together, both the law enforcement, the 
cities, the communities, ourselves, and say, "Here's a 
scenario, 23" of snow on the system, exit 234… these 
are the impacts, what do you guys do?" And you try to 
break down some of those walls. Government Services 
R
is
k
 D
o
m
in
an
t 
L
o
gi
c 
R
is
k
 
Mitigation 
Creates More 
Risk 
"We've taken action and the supplier just is unable to 
hit our spec or perform at the level we needed to. So 
then we need to go find a different supplier which 
creates another disruption, because now you're in a 
transition mode." Furniture 
Don't Let 
Mitigation 
Create More 
Risk 
"That market had three players in it, and when you 
have one player or two, you are much better enhanced 
by adding a third competitor to the market. So my 
interest was to keep all three companies in business [by 
letting prices fluctuate today] so that I would be able to 
take advantage of their competition for better prices for 
indefinite future." Government Services  
Vulnerabilities We don't want to tell our customers who our suppliers 
are, for fear they'll go around us. And our suppliers 
don't tell us who their suppliers are. There's not that 
level of collaboration. " Automotive  
 
Tolerance "We're going to have more variability. So there's an 
acceptance of a great level of risk. It's just accepting 
that it's the normal." Biodiesel  
112 
 
Overconfidence "When people think that the risk is something is under 
their experience, they don't escalate or reach for 
consensus, because it would be harder for them to 
explain all the background to the rest of the group." 
Automotive 
M
ar
k
et
 
Criticality "Not having a hamburger at McDonald's means you get 
chicken. For us it's not that interchangeable. I mean no 
one else has our medicines on the shelves, right? And, 
we generally have a lot of inventory." Pharmaceuticals 
Regulation "The regulatory environment is very complex. So, if we 
said we'd like to dual-source let's say everything. OK, it 
would take an enormous amount of work." Surgical 
Instruments  
Industry 
Specifics 
"We've done a pretty good job of aggressively securing 
capacity and pre-deploying before Black Friday." Retail  
E
vo
lu
ti
o
n
 o
f 
M
ec
h
an
is
m
s 
Life Cycle 
Progression 
"Our product line was much more narrow, not as many 
choices now, consumer-market. Everybody wants lots 
of options. So, as our products have grown, our supply 
base has grown, the complexity has grown." Furniture 
Not Hitting 
Goals 
"Historically we've been a very cost-focused 
organization, and we've seen a shift to where people 
are actually genuinely focused on service. Some of it 
was customer feedback." Consumer Durables 
Response 
Becomes 
Permanent 
"The people who fought the fires did go back to their 
day jobs, but a new organization was created, 
recognizing that need that we have a role to play with 
onboarding our suppliers." Agribusiness  
 
B
ra
ck
et
in
g
 
R
is
k
 S
ea
rc
h
in
g 
Inquire “We found out after the fact that their tooling is bad. 
They wanted us to buy new tools. Well, nobody ever 
talked about what's the issue? It was just "I need 
material.” "Well, we can only get you so much this 
week." Nobody ever asked, "Why are you only getting 
so much this week?" And then when we finally did ask 
that question, we were so far in the hole…” 
Pharmaceutical 
Communication "I actually don't believe it's the disruption itself. It's the 
communication about the disruption that typically can 
be the biggest constraint. If you don't have good 
communication, you don't know what, really, the 
disruption is. You're not understanding the timing and 
you may not likely understand its impact." Government 
Services  
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Probe "We all get caught in the day-to-day activities that we 
all have to do. And, if you don't spend time taking 
people out of that and look at the horizon, you're 
actually adding more risk that likely you're going to 
experience disruption and it's going to be pretty awful." 
Government Services 
Persistence "Getting that ability to negotiate, push back, and ask 
questions that would get you the answers you want. 
Manipulative questions like getting what you want out 
of that line of questioning. That line of conversation is a 
very valuable skill in the heat of the moment, in a post 
event type of scenario. Pharmaceutical 
In
it
ia
l R
es
p
o
n
se
 
Importance of 
Identifying 
Newness 
"We only have the wherewithal to monitor certain 
things. We have to rely on other people to identify an 
abnormality in there. And a lot of times we don't 
receive that information until late in the game, which 
then creates an issue." Government Services  
Pattern 
Recognition 
"In the past we would have said, "Oh, there's this big 
mis-scan bucket that's going on." "Now we said "That's 
not good enough. You've got to finish the rest of the 
trouble ticket on this one, so we can really understand 
what's going on." And what they found out going all the 
way back is we have a very systematic issue that not 
only happened on this one, but it can happen again, 
multiple times over. So, we better fix it." Furniture  
Data Analytics "How well we produce ten years from now is how well 
we do on our clinical trials today. That's something that 
popped out, we needed more expertise around 
understanding our clinical trial supply chain inventory 
processes." Pharmaceuticals 
M
an
ag
er
ia
l A
tt
en
ti
o
n
 
Who: Broader 
Audience 
"We did have a diverse representation of leaders and 
levels, so you had people who knew the process 
extremely well, and you also had SVPs all together 
helping, making sure they had the right support and the 
roadblocks removed." Retail  
When: 
Proactive vs 
Reactive 
"If you're going to prevent it's going to be a bit more 
strategic. If you're going to react it's purely tactical. 
There's no shortage of tactical operations people who 
know how to react to a problem. I could trip over them. 
But, I can find you many fewer who understand how to 
prevent the problem in the first place." Automotive  
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